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ABSTRACT 
 By law, refugees entering the United States must become self-sufficient as 
quickly as possible. But successful integration means more than achieving this 
benchmark. True integration involves social inclusion and ties to community and 
nation—particularly difficult for “free case” refugees who have no family in the U.S. and 
are wholly reliant upon resettlement organizations. This thesis asks the question: How 
can free case refugee resettlement practices be improved to enhance the likelihood of 
sociocultural integration and create stronger ties to the United States? A comparative 
assessment of three resettlement programs was undertaken to identify best practices. 
Integration success was assessed through statistical measures such as percentage of 
refugees who self-migrated after initial resettlement, and subjective measures of 
wellbeing and satisfaction as reported by refugees themselves. The analysis found 
refugees served by programs that lasted two years, as opposed to one year or less, 
reported a high degree of wellbeing and satisfaction, and less secondary migration. 
Moreover, refugees who were required to stay in a location for an extended period were 
less likely to engage in secondary migration afterward. This thesis recommends national 
refugee resettlement policy be updated to require local resettlement programs last a 
minimum of two years and that free case refugees must remain in their original 
resettlement location in exchange for three years of resettlement assistance. 
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Refugee integration is complicated to achieve and hard to measure. Part of the 
difficulty in measuring the success of integration is due to the lack of an universally-
accepted definition of integration by the international community. In the United States, The 
Refugee Act of 1980 (“the Act”) was the first significant federal effort to enumerate 
principles of refugee resettlement assistance.1 Though never using the term “integration,” 
in discussing expectations for resettled refugees and the programs that would be provided 
to them, the Act noted refugees were expected to be “effective resettled as quickly as 
possible,” the indicator of which was—is—economic self-sufficiency.2 The Act 
established three programs in furtherance of those principles—employment training and 
placement, English-language training, and short-term, limited cash assistance.3 The 
expressed vision of the Act was to ensure refugees were “effectively.4 
Refugee integration, however, is more than just satisfactory achievement of 
structured economic benchmarks. To achieve true integration, refugees must achieve—and 
refugee resettlement programs must address—structural integration measures, such as 
employment and housing, and sociocultural integration through social inclusion and 
acculturation.5 For refugees that have family in the United States with which they will be 
resettled, adjustment and integration are made easier by that family’s existing community 
connections. However, for “free case” refugees—those refugees that have no familial ties 
to the United States and are wholly dependent on their local resettlement agency 
caseworkers for assistance—obstacles to comprehensive integration are far more likely and 
                                                 
1 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, 94 Stat. 102 (March 17, 1980). 
2 Refugee Act of 1980. 
3 Refugee Act of 1980. 
4 Refugee Act of 1980. 
5 “The Debate over Integration: An Explainer,” Refugees Deeply, accessed November 22, 2019, 
https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2017/06/30/the-debate-over-integration-an-explainer. 
xiv 
challenging.6 These “free case” refugees are at a heightened risk for resettlement failure, 
as they lack any pre-existing familial network to assist with acclimating to the United States 
and will be placed in a location chosen for them by one of nine assigned volunteer agencies 
(VOLAGs).7 Identifying those resettlement programs that have shown success in refugee 
integration—beyond simple metrics of employment, education, and housing—will provide 
valuable information for policy recommendations for the United States’ Refugee 
Admission Program (USRAP). 
All local resettlement programs must provide a baseline of local services that mirror 
the requirements outlined in The Refugee Act of 1980: employment assistance, English 
language courses, and limited cash assistance to assist refugees in their first months in the 
United States.8 Accordingly, VOLAGs and local resettlement organizations focus on 
ensuring refugees find employment, once they are resettled.9 A 2017 case study in the 
journal Forced Migration Review, however, notes refugees resettled in the U.S. identified 
English-language acquisition as their most important goal, while cultural preservation held 
varying importance, depending on the refugee population interviewed.10 This incongruity 
in prioritization of needs that must be met to best promote integration must be considered 
in establishing effective resettlement programs “that [bridge] the gap between policy and 
the lived experience of integration, taking distinct cultural considerations into account in 
the formation of new policies and practices.”11 
                                                 
6 Laura P. Lunn, “Displaced and Disillusioned: ‘Free-Case’ Refugees and the Government’s 
Obligation to Facilitate Effective Resettlement,” The Journal of Gender, Race, and Justice; Iowa City 14, 
no. 3 (Summer 2011): 833–65. 
7 Will Jones and Alexander Teytelboym, “The Local Refugee Match: Aligning Refugees’ Preferences 
with the Capacities and Priorities of Localities,” Journal of Refugee Studies 31, no. 2 (August 16, 2017): 
152–78. 
8 Office of Refugee Resettlement, “Annual Report to Congress: Office of Refugee Resettlement Fiscal 
Year 2016” (report, Administration for Children and Families, June 14, 2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/
resource/office-of-refugee-resettlement-annual-report-to-congress-2016. 
9 Refugee Act of 1980, § 412(a)(1)(A). 
10 Catherine Tyson, “Towards a New Framework for Integration in the US,” Forced Migration 
Review, no. 54 (February 2017): 49. 
11 Tyson. 
xv 
Local resettlement programs are not uniform nationwide. They are limited only by 
funding and resources as to what they can offer refugees. Accordingly, quality of programs 
that seek to go beyond the baseline provision of employment services and housing 
assistance vary greatly, as do their measures of success.12 This thesis looks beyond 
traditional measures of success—employment, housing, and education—and conducts case 
studies of resettlement programs that achieved free case refugee integration success in 
other measures, namely reduced refugee secondary migration—the volitional movement 
by refugees after resettlement to another location, forsaking the resettlement program 
designated to assist with their resettlement—and a high percentage of refugees reporting 
strong satisfaction with their resettlement program and a favorable sense of wellbeing, 
elements of each program that contributed to those positive outcomes were identified.  
Two local resettlement programs were examined, a twenty-four-month Extended 
Case Management (ECM) program in Salt Lake City, Utah, and a traditional program in 
Utica, New York. Salt Lake City recognized that six months of resettlement services was 
inadequate to address the needs of most refugees, so it created an extended refugee case 
management (ECM) system.13 Over the two-year duration of the program, refugees 
reported increasing levels of positivity towards their wellbeing and the work of the 
resettlement agency in each successive interview.14 Of greatest significance, perhaps, is 
that the majority of refugees’ assessments of their own wellbeing did not move from “very 
bad” or “bad” to “good” or “very good” until the 12 to 24 month range, suggesting that the 
integratory benefits of a robust resettlement program are not realized in the first few months 
after a refugee arrives in the U.S., but subsequent to the first year of arrival.15  
                                                 
12 Anastasia Brown and Todd Scribner, “Unfulfilled Promises, Future Possibilities: The Refugee 
Resettlement System in the United States,” Journal on Migration and Human Security 2, no. 2 (2014): 
101–120. 
13 Stacey A. Shaw and Patrick Poulin, “Findings from an Extended Case Management U.S. Refugee 
Resettlement Program,” Journal of International Migration and Integration 16, no. 4 (November 2015): 
1099–1120, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12134-014-0374-0. 
14 Shaw and Poulin. 
15 Shaw and Poulin. 
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Utica, New York, did not have a particularly novel or lengthy resettlement program. 
What Utica did have—as a result of a long history of refugee migration and entrepreneurial 
success—was extensive, robust community support and involvement, taking up the lions’ 
share of work from the local resettlement organization.16 As of 2017, the percentage of 
Utica residents that are foreign-born was 19.4 percent. Even some refugees originally 
resettled in other locations in the United States have secondarily migrated to Utica, as 
evidenced by the MVRCR’s notice that it offers employment and other resettlement 
services to secondary migration refugees.17  
Beyond the United States, Denmark’s refugee resettlement program was studied, 
in particular the “Integration Contract” component that obligates refugees to stay in the 
location of initial resettlement for three years as part of acceptance for resettlement, and in 
furtherance of Denmark’s “spatial dispersal” policy—one component of the country’s 
“Nordic values” integration program.18 The program also requires satisfactory completion 
of mandatory Danish language and cultural integration courses, before refugees are 
expected to seek and obtain employment.19 As of 2019, fifteen years after initial placement 
in locales throughout Denmark, seventy-five percent of refugees are still in their location 
of original placement.20 Though somewhat draconian in nature, the three-year location 
stay requirement appears to have largely achieved its goal. 
                                                 
16 Alissa Scott, “‘Town That Loves Refugees’: Is it Perception or Reality in Utica?” Observer-
Dispatch, February 27, 2017, https://www.uticaod.com/news/20170227/town-that-loves-refugees-is-it-
perception-or-reality-in-utica. 
17 “Mohawk Valley Resource Center for Refugees Launches New Welcome Center,” Oneida Daily 
Dispatch, September 21, 2019, https://www.oneidadispatch.com/news/local-news/mohawk-valley-
resource-center-for-refugees-launches-new-welcome-center/article_8f5f5bb6-dc00-11e9-a429-
6f51c13d6a2c.html. 
18 Gunnar Myrberg, “Local Challenges and National Concerns: Municipal Level Responses to 
National Refugee Settlement Policies in Denmark and Sweden,” International Review of Administrative 
Sciences 83, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 322–39, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852315586309. 
19 Henrik Thomassen, The Integration of Refugees in Denmark (Luxembourg: European Parliament 
Policy Department, August 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/638397/ 
IPOL_STU(2019)638397(ANN02)_EN.pdf. 
20 Fabian Eckert, Mads Hejlesen, and Conor Walsh, “The Return to Big City Experience: Evidence 
from Danish Refugees” (working paper, Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute, Federal rEserve Bank 
of Minneapolis, September, 2019), https://doi.org/10.21034/iwp.24. 
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Based on the three programs studied, two recommendations were made for 
inclusion in the USRAP for free case refugee resettlement. The first is a requirement that 
local resettlement programs be extended to a minimum two-year duration, as in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Even if the programs offered are not of the highest caliber, continuing contact 
and assistance to refugees beyond one year has been shown to have a remarkably positive 
effect. The second recommendation is implementation of an obligatory three-year 
requirement to remain in the initial resettlement location, similar to the Danish Integration 
Contract model. Though enforcement would be problematic, if the agreement could be 
sufficiently incentivized—perhaps extending program assistance and services for the full 
three years—it might make secondary migration less attractive to free case refugees. 
In conclusion, refugee integration continues to be a significant homeland security 
concern. Statutorily, the U.S. looks no further than employment and economic self-
sufficiency, in assessing the integration of refugees. This is a flawed measure. A more 
comprehensive definition of integration, to include sociocultural integration, needs to be 
considered and agreed upon as an industry standard. Adopting the recommendations 
outlined above into U.S. refugee resettlement policies would ensure that free case refugee 
integration—under a new, comprehensive definition of integration—results more often and 
more consistently. 
xviii 
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A. DEFINING SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OUTCOMES IN REFUGEE 
RESETTLEMENT 
The Refugee Act of 1980 (“the Act”) was the first significant federal effort to 
enumerate principles of refugee resettlement assistance. The Act established three 
programs in furtherance of those principles—employment training and placement, English-
language training, and short-term, limited cash assistance.1 The expressed vision of the Act 
was to ensure refugees were “effectively resettled as quickly as possible,” the indicator of 
which was—is—economic self-sufficiency.2 Economic self-sufficiency continues to be 
the guiding principle behind the United States’ refugee resettlement efforts. Economic self-
sufficiency is an important aspect of refugee resettlement, of course, and its components—
employment rates, home ownership versus rental, and education levels—can be measured 
reasonably accurately.3  
Refugee integration, however, is more than just satisfactory achievement of 
structured economic benchmarks. The resettlement experience presents refugees with an 
“unique set of challenges and stresses related to acculturation into a new cultural setting … 
in the course of rebuilding and recovery.”4 Economic self-sufficiency is an incomplete and 
inadequate measure of integration, as it ignores less-easily quantifiable considerations, 
such as a refugee’s civic engagement, social cohesion and those programs and practices 
designed to nurture American values and the cultivation of loyalty and patriotism towards 
                                                 
1 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, 94 Stat. 102 (March 17, 1980). 
2 Refugee Act of 1980. 
3 For example, 65% of adult refugees aged 18–45 at time of resettlement found work and entered the 
labor force within one year of resettlement, increasing to a high of almost 90% in the labor force fourteen 
years after entry, exceeding the native born labor force participation rate of 75%. William N. Evans and 
Daniel Fitzgerald, “The Economic and Social Outcomes of Refugees in the United States: Evidence from 
the ACS” (working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2017), https://doi.org/10.3386/
w23498.  
4 Kate E. Murray, Graham R. Davidson, and Robert D. Schweitzer, “Review of Refugee Mental 
Health Interventions Following Resettlement: Best Practices and Recommendations,” American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry 80, no. 4 (2010): 576–85, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1111/j.1939-
0025.2010.01062.x, 582. 
2 
their new country.5 To achieve true integration, refugees must achieve – and refugee 
resettlement programs must address – structural integration measures, such as employment 
and housing, and sociocultural integration through social inclusion and acculturation.6   
By virtue of the circumstances surrounding their forced migration, refugees 
experience a high incidence of physical and mental health concerns and often report feeling 
a deep sense of social isolation.7 Rather than addressing those potential issues immediately 
upon resettlement, refugees are presented with the expectation of quickly obtaining 
employment.8 Refugees feel significant pressure to accept the first available employment 
after resettlement, as rapid employment is in keeping with the articulated goals of the 
Refugee Act of 1980 and oftentimes a local resettlement organizations’ funding is 
conditioned on ensuring high levels of employment among the refugees served.9 This 
thesis will argue that an unwavering focus on rapid employment is ill-advised and 
counterproductive to ensuring full integration and adoption of American values and 
loyalties. 
Apart from addressing immediate health issues, refugees consider English language 
mastery a necessary precursor to finding appropriate employment commensurate with their 
skills and experience.10 Half of refugees admitted through the United States Refugee 
Admission Program (USRAP) have no or poor English language skills at the time of 
entry.11 As recently as 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office 
                                                 
5 Catherine Tyson, “Towards a New Framework for Integration in the US,” Forced Migration Review, 
no. 54 (February 2017): 49.  
6 “The Debate over Integration: An Explainer,” Refugees Deeply, accessed November 22, 2019, 
https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2017/06/30/the-debate-over-integration-an-explainer. 
7 Stacey A. Shaw and Patrick Poulin, “Findings from an Extended Case Management U.S. Refugee 
Resettlement Program,” Journal of International Migration and Integration 16, no. 4 (November 2015): 
1099–1120, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12134-014-0374-0. 
8 Yvette M. Young, “Why Refugees Need More Than Just Immediate Employment,” Scholars 
Strategy Network, May 14, 2019, https://scholars.org/contribution/why-refugees-need-more-just-
immediate-employment. 
9 Shaw and Poulin, “Findings.” 
10 Tyson, “Towards a New Framework,” 2. 
11 Hamutal Bernstein, Bringing Evidence to the Refugee Integration Debate (Washington, DC: The 
Urban Institute, April 2018), 38. 
3 
of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) reported that five years after resettlement, fully half (50.2 
percent) of refugees still spoke little or no English.12 Among adult refugees, sixty-one 
percent were rated as Limited English Proficient (LEP).13 These unfortunate percentages 
make clear that continuing with a resettlement strategy that places primary emphasis on 
rapid employment, rather than on developing English language mastery, ensures that 
refugee resettlement in the United States will continue to be an incomplete process that 
prevents many refugees from achieving their full integration potential. 
The resettlement concerns and issues outlined above are even more problematic for 
those refugees that have no familial ties to the United States and are wholly dependent on 
their local resettlement agency caseworkers for assistance.14 These “free case” refugees 
are at a heightened risk for resettlement failure, as they lack any pre-existing familial 
network to assist with acclimating to the United States.15 Refugees are assigned to one of 
the nine volunteer agencies (“VOLAGs”), which arrange for resettlement services with a 
local resettlement organization in the location ultimately selected by the VOLAG for 
resettlement.16 Refugees with family ties in the U.S. are resettled with or near those family 
members, but, for free case refugees, the assigned VOLAG decides resettlement location 
and assign the case to its local partners.17 The factors the VOLAG uses to determine free 
case refugee resettlement locations include pre-existing contractual relationships with local 
                                                 
12 Shaw and Poulin, “Findings.” 
13 Jie Zong, Michael Fix, and Kate Hooper, How Are Refugees Faring? Integration at U.S. and State 
Levels (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/how-
are-refugees-faring-integration-us-and-state-levels. 
14 Laura P. Lunn, “Displaced and Disillusioned: ‘Free-Case’ Refugees and the Government’s 
Obligation to Facilitate Effective Resettlement,” The Journal of Gender, Race, and Justice 14, no. 3 
(Summer 2011): 833–65. 
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16, 2017): 152–78. 
16 As of January 19, 2019, the nine voluntary agencies are Church World Services; Ethiopian 
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resettlement organizations, national resettlement priorities, and even to some degree 
serendipity.18  
The lack of participation by free case refugees in the decision-making process 
creates the potential for additional hurdles in integration success, making all the more 
important the identification and incorporation into a national strategy the resettlement “best 
practices” that have shown success in promoting the adoption and incorporation of core 
American values. Unfortunately, the United States refugee resettlement model is largely 
self-policing.19 VOLAGs monitor the quality of care provided by those local organizations 
with which they maintain contractual service relationships, and all that the law requires of 
the VOLAGs is provision of an annual report confirming their programs comply with the 
statutory minimum placement and resettlement guidelines.20 While all refugees are 
provided statutorily-mandated assistance, services beyond that minimum threshold are 
local program-dependent and inconsistently provided. Under such circumstances, it seems 
logical to conclude that the less involved the local agency is, the less well positioned are 
its refugees for continued integration. 
There are three variables in the refugee integration equation: the refugee, the 
community, and the resettlement assistance program. With funding from the Office of 
Refugee Resettlement (ORR), all local resettlement programs must provide a baseline of 
local services that mirror the requirements outlined in the Refugee Act of 1980: 
employment assistance, English language courses, and limited cash assistance to assist 
refugees in their first months in the United States.21 Beyond that, local organizations are 
limited only by funding and resources as to what programs they can or will offer refugees. 
                                                 
18 Tamar Mott Forrest and Lawrence A. Brown, “Organization-Led Migration, Individual Choice, and 
Refugee Resettlement in the U.S.: Seeking Regularities,” Geographical Review 104, no. 1 (January 2014): 
10–32. 
19 Accreditation programs exist for refugee resettlement organizations; however, accreditation is not a 
statutory nor VOLAG-maintained requirement. “Standard,” Council on Accreditation, accessed November 
18, 2019, https://coanet.org/standard/rrs/. 
20 Authorization for Programs for Domestic Resettlement of and Assistance to Refugees, 8 U.S.C. § 
1522(b)(8) (2006). 
21 Office of Refugee Resettlement, “Annual Report to Congress: Office of Refugee Resettlement 
Fiscal Year 2016” (report, Administration for Children and Families, June 14, 2018), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/office-of-refugee-resettlement-annual-report-to-congress-2016. 
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Accordingly, quality of programs that seek to go beyond the baseline provision of 
employment services and housing assistance vary greatly.22 A refugee may still find 
success and adopt core American values independent of support from their community and 
local resettlement organization, but it is less likely.23 Conversely, a refugee who enjoys 
overt support and assistance from their local resettlement agency and community is much 
more likely to develop strong ties to their new home and nation.24 Identifying those 
programs and practices that provide not only the required structural integration components 
of employment, language and housing support, but also sociocultural efforts that facilitate 
the refugees’ development of social connections and a sense of communal identity will be 
the focus of this thesis. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can free case refugee resettlement practices be improved to enhance 
comprehensive integration and better foster American values? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Refugee Employment as the Dominant Metric in Resettlement Success 
Much of the literature on the topic of refugee resettlement in the U.S. acknowledges 
that refugee economic self-sufficiency through rapid employment is of primary importance 
in the United States’ policies towards refugee admission and resettlement.25 The specific 
language used in the Refugee Act of 1980 notes a primary objective of the Act is to 
“provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and 
                                                 
22 Anastasia Brown and Todd Scribner, “Unfulfilled Promises, Future Possibilities: The Refugee 
Resettlement System in the United States,” Journal on Migration and Human Security 2, no. 2 (2014): 
101–120. 
23 Damir Utržan, Elizabeth Wieling, and Timothy Piehler, “A Needs and Readiness Assessment of the 
United States Refugee Resettlement Program: Focus on Syrian Asylum-Seekers and Refugees,” 
International Migration 57, no. 1 (2019): 127–44, https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12479. 
24 Utržan, Wieling, and Piehler. 
25 Government Accountability Office, Refugee Resettlement, Greater Consultation with Community 
Stakeholders Could Strengthen Program, GAO-12-729 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability 
Office, 2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf. 
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absorption of those refugees who are admitted.”26 Effective resettlement and absorption 
were not specifically defined, but the delineation of programs that were to be established 
and provided to refugees made clear that employment would be viewed as the primary 
metric in assessing refugee resettlement.27 Employment, and the other two programs—
English language training and cash assistance—would be provided, in order for refugees 
to reach economic self-sufficiency, a term used synonymously with “effective 
resettlement.”28 In the eyes of the federal government of 1980, effective resettlement was 
tied to simple measures of economic achievement and nothing more. The word 
“integration” never once appears in the text of the Refugee Act of 1980.29 
This narrow view of effective resettlement, established almost 40 years ago, 
continues to be the federal government’s litmus test for resettlement success. The 
Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement’s (HHS ORR) 
informational webpage notes “employability services” as its primary service focus and 
touts the success of its refugee employment efforts.30 Catholic Charities, one of the nine 
VOLAGs contracted by HHS ORR, commissioned a report released in June 2018 touting 
the benefits of refugee resettlement to the United States. That report’s first identified 
measure of refugee contribution and value to this country was the percentage of refugees 
employed (68 percent).31 By comparison, the percentage of all persons in the U.S. 
employed in 2018 was lower (60.5 percent).32 To the federal government, refugee 
employment remains the single most considered metric in resettlement and the controlling 
consideration in resettlement location determinations.  
                                                 
26 Refugee Act of 1980, § 101(b). 
27 Refugee Act of 1980, § 412(a)(1)(A). 
28 Refugee Act of 1980, § 412. 
29 Refugee Act of 1980. 
30 “Refugee Social Services,” Office of Refugee Resettlement, accessed April 2, 2019, 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/refugee-social-services. 
31 “New Report Demonstrates Positive Impact of Refugees in United States,” Catholic Charities USA, 
June 29, 2018, https://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/press_release/new-report-demonstrates-positive-
impact-of-refugees-in-united-states/. 
32 “Bureau of Labor Statistics Data,” accessed November 24, 2019, https://data.bls.gov/pdq/
SurveyOutputServlet. 
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The United States is hardly alone, however, in this practice. A review of refugee 
resettlement programs in the nine countries, including the U.S., that take in the majority of 
the world’s resettled refugees shows that all countries offer vocational training and 
assistance and track the employment statistics of refugees.33 Unlike the U.S., however, 
other countries place less import on finding immediate employment, instead first focusing 
on language education and acculturation. Nonetheless, employment is an easily calculable 
metric, far easier to identify and assess than the subjective measurement of a refugee’s 
sense of inclusion or progress along the continuum of integration from “outsider” to full 
adoption of the values of the host nation.34 The importance of refugee employment as a 
component of integration coupled with the relative ease of measurement makes it, in many 
ways, the default metric for assessing success of refugee resettlement programs.  
2. Refugee Perspective on Integration Differs from Federal Priorities 
Studies conducted by non-governmental entities suggest refugees place less 
emphasis on employment as the first priority in their integration experience. A 2017 case 
study in the journal Forced Migration Review notes refugees resettled in the U.S. identified 
English-language acquisition as their most important goal, while cultural preservation held 
varying importance, depending on the refugee population interviewed.35 This incongruity 
in prioritization of needs that must be met to best promote integration must be considered 
in establishing effective resettlement programs “that [bridge] the gap between policy and 
the lived experience of integration, taking distinct cultural considerations into account in 
the formation of new policies and practices.”36 As the Act is silent on such cultural 
concerns, it falls to states, communities, and even the refugees themselves to establish 
programs that address those issues. 
                                                 
33 Uma A. Segal and Doreen Elliott, Refugees Worldwide (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 
Table 7.7, 949. 
34 Segal and Elliott. 
35 Tyson, “Towards a New Framework.”  
36 Tyson. 
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Increasingly, the discourse on refugee integration is moving beyond a simple tally 
of employment percentages to look at other factors. Catherine Tyson of the Johns Hopkins 
School of Advanced International Studies notes that U.S. resettlement policy continues to 
rely on American values of what makes a “productive citizen”—particularly employment. 
This narrow focus on employment “ultimately leaves some, maybe many, refugees 
struggling even after the official period of resettlement is over.”37 Moreover, the literature 
notes, as other countries evolve their policies and programs to take a more holistic view of 
resettlement and integration, the U.S. risks falling further behind the international 
community in effective integration practices.38  
Further, the literature suggests that employment may be difficult to obtain by 
refugees who come from countries and ethnicities that are physically and culturally distinct 
from the host community’s dominant populations. In the Immigration Policy Lab (IPL) 
Working Paper, “Boosting Refugee Outcomes: Evidence from Policy, Academia, and 
Social Innovation,” Salma Mousa notes that while refugees in the United States found work 
faster than their Canadian and European counterparts, Burmese, Iraqi and Somali refugees 
had lower rates of employment than refugees from other countries.39 In a 2010 report, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that unemployment or underemployment 
was particularly pronounced in the Iraqi refugee community.40 Noting that the U.S. has 
been engaged in ongoing military operations for over fifteen years in Iraq, and over seven 
years at the time of the GAO report, those employment difficulties may have far more to 
do with that group’s ethnicity than any other factor that might impede employment.  
The literature also reveals that pressure to quickly find employment and realize self-
sufficiency, to the exclusion of other considerations, results in climbing rates of suicide 
                                                 
37 Tyson. 
38 Refugees Deeply, “The Debate over Integration.” 
39 Salma Mousa, “Boosting Refugee Outcomes: Evidence from Policy, Academia, and Social 
Innovation” (scholarly paper, Social Science Research Network, October 2, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=3259255. 
40 Government Accountability Office, Iraqi Refugees and Special Immigrant Visa Holders Face 
Challenges Resettling in the United States and Obtaining U.S. Government Employment, GAO-10-274 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, March 2010). 
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and pervasive feelings of frustration and isolation in certain refugee communities.41 For 
example, Paul Kenny and Kate Lockwood-Kenny have documented the extent to which 
refugees from Myanmar belonging to the Karen (or “Kariang”) Christian minority ethnic 
group, despite securing gainful employment shortly after arrival in the U.S., continued to 
struggle with isolation and depression long after initial resettlement.42 This lack of 
connection to their first home in America often resulted in secondary and tertiary migration 
patterns among the Karen within the United States.43 Similarly, literature exploring an 
increase in suicides among recently arrived Bhutanese refugees, regardless of employment 
status, found frustrations over the lack of language training opportunities and a perceived 
lack of adequate involvement and assistance from local resettlement agencies led to 
feelings of despair.44 Gainfully employed or not, if a refugee feels isolated, full and lasting 
integration is not achieved.  
3. The Role of Community Is Critical in a Refugee’s Successful 
Integration 
The literature includes studies examining community-based resettlement programs. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that if refugees are not given a say 
in their placement determinations, then successful integration becomes more reliant on the 
local programs and resources expended for free case refugees in resettlement locations.45 
This reliance on programs over environment is not necessarily a negative, provided the 
resettlement program is sufficiently robust and effective. Authors Stacey Shaw and Patrick 
Poulin reviewed an Extended Case Management (ECM) program for refugees resettled in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, that created a two-year resettlement model that included significant, 
engaged social outreach and community interaction, as well as mandating a schedule of 
                                                 
41 Tyson, “Towards a New Framework.” 
42 Paul Kenny and Kate Lockwood-Kenny, “A Mixed Blessing: Karen Resettlement to the United 
States,” Journal of Refugee Studies 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 217–38. 
43 Kenny and Lockwood-Kenny. 
44 Ashley K. Hagaman et al., “An Investigation into Suicides among Bhutanese Refugees Resettled in 
the United States Between 2008 and 2011,” Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health 18, no. 4 (August 
2016): 819–27, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10903-015-0326-6. 
45 Government Accountability Office, Refugee Resettlement. 
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frequent home visits by caseworkers who continuously solicited substantive feedback on 
the value of the program’s components from the refugees served.46  
Literature regarding this and other integration-focused resettlement programs noted 
that such tailored efforts resulted in participating refugees experiencing substantial 
improvements in well-being and marked reductions in needs concerning health, 
employment, finances, housing education, and family/community circumstances over that 
two-year time frame.47 Likewise, similar long-term successes were noted in Utica, New 
York, where community-based efforts engaged not only refugees but also the local 
citizenry to create social bridges, an essential component in comprehensive integration.48 
The findings show a pattern—when welcoming communities have sufficient resources 
available, whether through federal funding or other means, long-term programs can be 
crafted that offer free case refugees a much greater likelihood of successful integration on 
multiple levels, notwithstanding the refugees’ lack of participation in the decision as to 
their resettlement destination.  
Unfortunately, such successes are not universal. Relevant literature points to 
instances of local resettlement programs failing to adequately serve the needs of their 
refugee constituency, resulting in many refugees opting to resort to secondary migration to 
other locations. Many articles and reports referenced the problematic resettlement of free 
case Somali refugees in the early 2000s.49 These refugees were initially resettled in inner-
city areas of Atlanta, Chicago, and Nashville—cities that presumably had been vetted by 
the VOLAGs and identified as suitable for refugee resettlement, with appropriate 
employment and affordable housing opportunities. Soon after their resettlement, however, 
a significant percentage of refugees relocated to Portland and Lewiston, Maine—two 
communities with a small but established Somali presence. Both towns, however, were ill-
                                                 
46 Stacey A. Shaw and Patrick Poulin, “Findings.” 
47 Shaw and Poulin. 
48 R. Scott Smith, “The Case of a City Where 1 in 6 Residents Is a Refugee: Ecological Factors and 
Host Community Adaptation in Successful Resettlement,” American Journal of Community Psychology 42, 
no. 3–4 (December 2008): 328–42, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10464-008-9208-6. 
49 Forrest and Brown, “Organization-Led Migration.” 
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equipped and wholly unprepared to deal with the rapid influx of thousands of Somali 
refugees, who, by virtue of their secondary migration were no longer receiving resettlement 
services by their assigned resettlement agency.50 The refugees’ need for assistance from 
their adopted communities created conflicts between the communities and their new 
refugee population.51  
These events spurred the literature on the study of refugee resettlement to look 
beyond obvious factors such as employment, housing, and even proximity to persons and 
groups of similar nationality and ethnicity in assessing the success of resettlement 
programs in integrating refugees.52 Where before there had been a fairly simple formula 
for success—resettle free case refugees in communities with available housing and jobs, 
and all the better if the community had pre-existing neighborhoods with residents sharing 
similar nationality or ethnicity—the secondary self-migration of Somali refugees away 
from established Somali communities and local resettlement support in Atlanta, Chicago 
and Nashville in the early 2000s demonstrated that successful resettlement and integration 
required far more than just satisfying those three conditions.53  
Subsequently, the literature began to more fully explore the role community plays 
in refugee integration. Will Jones and Alexander Teytelboym’s research helped illuminate 
the importance of proportionality—identifying the number of refugees a community can 
responsibly host—and suitability—ensuring that refugees should ideally be placed in host 
communities that offer refugees the best opportunities for their talents and skills, as 
previously ignored or little-considered variables in refugee resettlement location 
determinations to optimize the potential for successful, comprehensive integration.54 
                                                 
50 Steve Bottari, “What Portland Can Learn from Lewiston’s Immigrant Surge 20 Years Ago,” 
WMTW, July 24, 2019, https://www.wmtw.com/article/what-portland-can-learn-from-lewiston-s-
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51 Peter Blais, “The Shock of the New,” Planning 69, no. 2 (February 2003): 14–17. 
52 Jeffrey Bloem and Scott Loveridge, “The Secondary Migration of Refugees Resettled in the US,” 
Forced Migration Review, no. 54 (February 2017): 26–28. 
53 Kimberly A. Huisman, “Why Maine? Secondary Migration Decisions of Somali Refugees,” 
Ìrìnkèrindò: A Journal of African Migration, no. 5 (December 2011), https://africamigration.com/archives/
issue5-dec2011. 
54 Jones and Teytelboym, “The Local Refugee Match,” 152. 
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These are certainly not the only variables in determining best location practices or 
likelihood of successful integration, but they are strong factors to aid in the determination 
of resettlement location, particularly if local organizations lack suitably tailored 
resettlement programs. 
Unfortunately, there is little the United States can do to prevent resettled free case 
refugees from engaging in secondary migration. Refugees dissatisfied with their initial U.S. 
resettlement location can relocate at any time, though they risk the loss of assistance from 
their assigned local resettlement organization. The literature exploring refugee secondary 
migration suggests lasting ramifications that could delay or preclude entirely 
comprehensive integration and the cultivation of national values.55 Studies determined that 
post-resettlement migration works in opposition to national goals of a more uniform 
dispersal of refugees between rural and urban centers and creates a greater likelihood of 
homogeneous ethnic enclaves.56 Notwithstanding the potentially negative consequences 
of secondary migration, the data shows conclusively that the percentage of refugees that 
engage in secondary migration has steadily increased over the past thirty-five years.57 
Consequently, the body of literature evaluating refugee resettlement programs must now 
wrestle with the question whether or not initial resettlement should be considered a true 
permanent placement, or more accurately a “staging area,” from which refugees will depart 
shortly after arrival for a location of their own choosing. Acknowledging such a new reality 
would fundamentally change the nature of refugee resettlement practices and practices in 
the United States.  
The relevant literature identified certain countries in Scandinavia—most notably 
Denmark—that have resolved the dilemma of refugee secondary migration by requiring 
prospective refugees to sign an “Integration Contract” that requires refugees remain for 
                                                 
55 Jeffrey Bloem and Scott Loveridge, “The Costs of Secondary Migration: Perspectives from Local 
Voluntary Agencies in the USA,” Journal of International Migration and Integration 19, no. 2 (May 1, 
2018): 233–51. 
56 Bloem and Loveridge, “Secondary Migration.” 
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three years in the location designated for them by the Danish immigration authority.58 This 
requirement furthers the government’s “spatial dispersion” policy designed to prevent 
refugees from isolating themselves in ethnic enclaves and forcing the development of 
social ties with their host community. In addition, as Guilherme notes, Denmark requires 
refugees to sign a “declaration pledging their commitment to integrate and to be active 
citizens in society.”59 She further stresses that to facilitate the development of those local 
cultural values, Denmark prioritizes and mandates language and Danish culture instruction 
for the first year of resettlement, over employment assistance.60 The literature notes that 
of the Scandinavian countries, Denmark has the most restrictive resettlement program, in 
terms of freedom of movement by refugees. However, after their three-year contractual 
period had expired, the majority of refugees in Denmark remained in their initially 
designated location.61  
The body of literature assessing refugee resettlement in Scandinavia notes those 
programs are rooted in the countries’ history of strong social welfare as a fundamental 
construct of governance.62 Further, the literature illustrates that these programs were 
developed in and tailored for countries that are relatively small in both population and 
geography and with native populations that were largely ethnically homogeneous. Despite 
the inarguable integration success of Denmark’s resettlement program, much of the 
literature views the program negatively, as forcibly imposing Danish culture on refugees 
at the expense of their own ethnic identity.63  
                                                 
58 Gunnar Myrberg, “Local Challenges and National Concerns: Municipal Level Responses to 
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As the literature exploring refugee resettlement and integration challenges has 
developed, the more the critical importance of the third “stakeholder” in refugee 
resettlement, the community, is understood.64 Research conducted by the federal 
government acknowledges prioritizing locations with employment opportunities ignores 
the importance of looking beyond a host community’s employment and housing 
availability and considering the community’s perceptions of refugees as a whole.65 In sum, 
studies conducted by private organizations and the federal government recommend the 
focus in refugee resettlement shift and expand beyond simple metrics of employment and 
housing, and proactively seek out, develop and incorporate community involvement and 
engagement to create vital social bridges that will ensure refugees benefit from a more 
robust and comprehensive refugee integration experience.66  
To that end, in April 2015, the authors of the White House Task Force on New 
Americans’ “Strategic Action Plan on Immigrant and Refugee Integration,” recommended 
the creation of a “Toolkit for Local Communities,” to provide some measure of guidance 
for developing resettlement programs at the community level.67 This action plan 
recognized as a central truth that communities play a critical role in fostering efforts that 
create social bridges and a sense of belonging by refugees—essential for the ultimate 
success of immigrants and refugees.68 The report noted that far more than the basic U.S. 
history and civics knowledge required for immigrants to become naturalized citizens, such 
community engagement promotes a heightened sense of civic responsibility and 
participation in governance among immigrants and a readier embracement of American 
values.69 Unfortunately, progress towards creation and implementation of the 
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recommended toolkit was discontinued as a result of the change in administration after the 
2016 election. As reported by the Department of States’ Bureau of Population, Refugee 
and Migration (PRM), the number of refugees admitted to the United States was 
dramatically reduced beginning in 2017.70 Many resettlement programs were shuttered or 
significantly downsized as federal funding shifted away from refugee resettlement to 
security efforts along the southern border with Mexico.71 Unfortunately, at a time when 
the great weight of evidence shows the value and tangible gains possible through programs 
that cultivate robust community engagement and involvement, the United States has taken 
a deliberate step backwards from true integration practices with a renewed emphasis and 
single-minded focus on requiring refugees to attain swift economic self-sufficiency. 
The body of literature exploring the role of the community in immigrant integration, 
be it government reports or private organizations’ research, acknowledges that the effort 
must be a “two-way street,” requiring the active and willing participation of a plethora of 
community actors.72 To avoid such scenarios and community disaffection, the literature 
noted it is critical that relationships between refugees and community members be 
cultivated, to address and dispel negative community attitudes towards refugees.73 As part 
of her research into this issue, Michaela Hynie identifies a more expansive “Holistic 
Immigration Model” (HIM) for refugee integration that explores “the nature of the 
relationships between refugees and other members of their communities … [and] general 
community attitudes and beliefs about refugees.”74 In her analysis, she confirms that 
successful integration is not based on any one factor, nor is it limited to the efforts of the 
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refugees. It is a composite of multiple factors that include not only the refugees’ 
perceptions of their integration and the government’s identified policy outcomes, but also 
the community’s perceptions of integrating refugees. 
Literature concerning free case refugee resettlement and integration practices in the 
United States acknowledges certain realities—first and foremost, that resettlement location 
determinations will be made without pre-selection input from the free case refugees 
themselves, and, secondly, that the determination will be weighted in favor of locations 
that can demonstrate a need for a low-skilled labor pool.75 As Shaw and Poulin point out, 
this lack of involvement in the destination determination is not necessarily an 
insurmountable obstacle to positive, comprehensive integration, provided available 
resettlement programs are of sufficient duration and tailored to the unique needs of the 
refugees served, learned through frequent regular and deliberate engagement.76 The best 
resettlement program will be doomed to fail, however, if it does not enjoy the support of 
the local community. Every resettlement program eventually ends, and communities that 
have established connections to their refugee populations have a greater likelihood of 
retaining those refugees. Secondary migration after resettlement frustrates integration and 
delays or prevents those refugees’ transition from immigrant to integrated community 
member.  
In sum, the literature available identifies a number of resettlement programs that 
have shown success in not only getting refugees economically self-sufficient, but in 
cultivating strong community ties that facilitate the inculcation of American values and a 
deeply-rooted sense of patriotism.77 Conversely, many resettlement programs focus their 
efforts principally on ensuring that refugees find employment, with little coordination with 
the host community or manifest concern for the struggles refugees face in adjusting to their 
new world. Notwithstanding the government’s acknowledgment of the importance of 
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community in immigrant integration, that effort falls largely to the local communities to 
craft, fund, and implement.  
Additionally, largely missing from the literature are studies and evaluations of 
integrations of exclusively free case refugees. The few that do focus in whole or in part on 
free case refugees note the additional complexities of addressing issues in a population that 
does not have any pre-existing connection to their resettlement location. This thesis will 
identify those aspects of identified successful refugee resettlement programs, and craft 
policy recommendations based on those programs that will increase the likelihood of 
comprehensive refugee integration. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
First, I studied the evidence—case studies and secondary literature—documenting 
programs that provide direct assistance to free case refugees upon their resettlement in the 
United States over the past twenty-five years. Programs in the United States and abroad 
that showed significant success in free case refugee integration were assessed, and 
programmatic commonalities identified for incorporation into policy recommendations for 
the United States Refugee Admission Program. Successful integration was measured 
through evidence of economic self-sufficiency but also through free case refugees’ own 
impressions of their local resettlement agency’s efforts, as well as their involvement and 
interaction with their host community.78 Refugee assessments of their resettlement are 
anecdotal and, as such, cannot be a reliable measure of success, but another measure of 
refugee satisfaction with resettlement and integration is the percentage of refugees who 
engaged in secondary migration, as compared to the percentage nationwide, which can be 
tracked.79 
Common linkages and parallel practices between resettlement programs were 
analyzed to determine essential, non-site-specific components that could be universally 
applied in resettlement programs in any location. These identified programmatic actions 
                                                 
78 Shaw and Poulin, “Findings.” 
79 Bloem and Loveridge, “Secondary Migration.” 
18 
and practices hold value in charting the future course of refugee resettlement, via the United 
States Refugee Admission Program. While exploring programs currently implemented in 
various resettlement communities in the U.S. was critical to this study, other nations, such 
as the Scandinavian countries of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, have also grappled with 
the conundrum of finding effective state-sponsored support structures and programs that 
ensure refugees ultimately become citizens with strong ties of pride, loyalty and 
responsibility to their adopted country. Reviewing those countries’ programs provided 
information useful to the analysis of our free case refugee integration practices.  
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II will outline refugee admission and resettlement law, programs, policies 
and practices in the United States, paying particular attention to historical private 
organizational responses to refugee migration that evolved into the current decisional and 
operational role enjoyed by volunteer agencies over resettlement programs as part of the 
current, codified public-private partnership. Understanding the expressed goals of our 
national refugee resettlement program, the component programs designed to meet those 
goals, and the current extent and limitations of those programs, will provide the reader with 
essential information in evaluating the effectiveness of free case refugee resettlement 
efforts in the United States. 
Chapter III will identify obstacles and challenges to comprehensive free case 
refugee integration. From the stress of forced displacement from their native country to the 
expectation that refugees quickly become economically self-sufficient and no longer reliant 
on public assistance, the pressure put on refugees can be extraordinary and act as a barrier 
to effective integration. Finally, Chapter III will explore the ramifications to refugees of 
inadequate and insufficient resettlement programs.  
Chapter IV will examine refugee resettlement programs domestically and 
internationally that have shown success in integrating refugees into their host communities 
and nations, measured not by mere employment rates, but by reductions in secondary 
migration and positive assessments of the programs and personal wellbeing reported by the 
refugees. Exploring these programs provides essential information in evaluating the 
19 
continuing viability of current resettlement programs in achieving successful integration, 
as that term moves further away from an emphasis on economic self-sufficiency and 
becomes more holistic and nuanced.  
Chapter V will begin with an analysis of the programs reviewed, identifying those 
programmatic, community, and governmental practices that led to increased levels of 
personal satisfaction and wellbeing and reduced secondary migration among the 
participating refugees. From that analysis, policy recommendations will be developed that 
should be considered for incorporation into current and future United States’ refugee 
resettlement practices to facilitate better and more comprehensive refugee integration into 
American society. This chapter will conclude with final observations on the benefits to the 
United States of incorporating those identified and recommended refugee resettlement 
programs and practices and areas of continuing concern, for future study and consideration. 
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II. REFUGEE ADMISSION AND RESETTLEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader an understanding of the structure 
and framework for refugee resettlement in the United States. To accomplish this objective, 
a brief overview of refugee admissions in the United States and the significant role 
volunteer agencies play in resettlement efforts is provided. From exclusively private, 
charitable assistance in the late nineteenth century to the current public-private partnership 
that oversees the world’s largest refugee resettlement program, the extensive participation 
and key decision-making authority of volunteer agencies in refugee resettlement in the U.S. 
is far greater than that enjoyed by private organizations in any other refugee-hosting 
countries. The chain of events and influences that led to this unique partnership will be 
examined.  
This chapter will then review the three resettlement component programs required 
by the Refugee Act of 1980 (“the Act”), the pivotal legislation concerning refugee 
resettlement programs. These programs—employment assistance and training, English-
language courses, and limited cash assistance—must be made available to all arriving 
refugees and constitute the primary mechanism for, in the words of the Act, the 
“absorption” of arriving refugees into the fabric of American society.80 Beyond those 
programs, this chapter will outline current resettlement assistance available to refugees, 
such as medical and social services. Finally, this chapter will outline the process by which 
the volunteer agencies assign refugees’ resettlement locations in the U.S., paying particular 
attention to “free case” refugees, who have no familial links to the United States.   
A. REFUGEE ASSISTANCE: PAST AND PRESENT 
The United States has been a beacon of hope, bastion of safety, and land of promise 
for the displaced of the world for longer than it has been a country. In 1776, the year the 
United States declared independence from Great Britain, Thomas Paine wrote, “This new 
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world hath been the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from 
every part of Europe.”81 For the greater part of this nation’s history, however, arriving 
refugees found no governmental assistance available to them. Prior to World War II, 
resettlement was essentially a personal matter, and refugees successfully navigated—or 
not—resettlement issues on their own, or found assistance from private organizations.82 
Governmental involvement and oversight of refugee resettlement processes and programs 
is a relatively recent development.  
Since passage of the Refugee Act of 1980—the first concerted effort by the 
government to pull together under one single piece of legislation the myriad, disparate 
threads of refugee policies and practices—the U.S. has admitted and resettled over 3 
million refugees.83 Fully two-thirds of the world’s refugees resettled between 1982 and 
2016 were resettled in the U.S.84 In Fiscal Year 2016, the last year of admissions 
maintained by President Barack Obama’s administration, the U.S. accepted 84,995 
refugees from 79 countries for resettlement.85 As part of the Trump administration’s 
comprehensive immigration reform strategy, however, the maximum annual number of 
refugee admissions allowed (refugee ceiling) decreased each year, beginning in 2017, and 
was set at an all-time low of 30,000 for Fiscal Year 2019.86 As a result, refugee admissions 
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plummeted and resettlement has “slowed to a trickle.”87 Figure 1 is a table prepared by the 
Migration Policy Institute, noting annual refugee admissions each fiscal year since 
implementation of the Act, in comparison to the refugee admission and resettlement 
ceilings established each year by the President of the United States.88 
 
Figure 1. U.S. Refugee Ceilings and Admissions, 1980–201989 
Despite these recent reductions, the United States’ refugee resettlement program 
remains the largest refugee resettlement program in the world, with over 1.65 billion dollars 
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appropriated in 2016 for the Department of State, Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), 
of which over 700 million dollars were earmarked for refugee resettlement efforts.90 This 
level of funding illustrates how massive an enterprise is refugee resettlement in this 
country, requiring the combined and coordinated efforts of numerous local, state, and 
federal agencies, as well as private organizations, that comprise the United States Refugee 
Admissions Program (USRAP).91  
B. THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES IN REFUGEE ADMISSION 
AND RESETTLEMENT 
The United States has a complicated history and relationship with aid and assistance 
organizations. Americans have always prided themselves on an ethos of self-sufficiency, 
independence, and resourceful grit. The idea of needing or accepting help from others is 
anathema to many Americans, viewed as evidence of laziness, weakness and failure. The 
ability to provide for oneself and family—to be economically self-sufficient—eschewing 
any help or assistance, is perhaps one of our most deeply-ingrained American values. 
Conversely, the U.S. has always been a generous provider of assistance to those in need. 
This duality may have been both the impetus for the ascension of private charitable 
organizations in an era when governmental assistance for refugees was non-existent, and 
the justification for the role private organizations currently play in refugee admission and 
resettlement. 
There are nine voluntary organizations, or “VOLAGs” involved in refugee 
admission and resettlement in the United States.92 VOLAGs coordinate and control critical 
aspects of every stage of these processes, from providing testimony to Congress regarding 
the number of refugees that should be admitted, to determining resettlement locations for 
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the majority of refugees. Considering their inextricable involvement in virtually all aspects 
of the nation’s refugee program, it is of little surprise that the majority of VOLAG funding 
comes from the federal government, primarily through the Department of State’s Office of 
Refugee Resettlement’s (ORR) “Matching Grant” program.93 In many ways, the U.S. 
relationship with VOLAGs could be seen as similar to a private corporation’s outsourcing 
of a project to another organization with specific expertise. 
Public-private partnerships in refugee resettlement are not unique to the United 
States, but the legally-mandated consultation and participation of VOLAGs in resettlement 
location determinations certainly is.94 While VOLAGs make resettlement location 
determinations in the United States, apart from Canada, which allows for private 
sponsorship as one component of its resettlement program, no other major refugee 
resettlement host country does this. In those countries, refugee resettlement location 
determinations are made by the state, not the private non-governmental organizations that 
may be involved in some capacity in post-resettlement efforts.95 The United States’ 
departure from this model is the result of multiple factors—the sheer size of the country, 
the scale and scope of the refugee program, and the pre-existing infrastructure of private 
organizations supporting refugee resettlement at the time of creation of the USRAP. 
Historically, VOLAGs were assisting refugees well before federal interest and 
involvement, largely because prior to World War II, there was little need for government 
involvement in what were relatively small refugee migration events to the U.S. Assistance 
fell along religious lines. In the latter years of the 19th century and decades before post-
World War II diasporas in Europe spurred the U.S. to action, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society (HIAS) offered assistance to Jewish refugees suffering religious persecution in 
Russia and Eastern Europe.96 The American Catholic Church, the precursor to today’s 
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Catholic Charities, provided refugees aid and assistance as far back as the late 1930s.97 
Structured, comprehensive government refugee resettlement was virtually non-existent. 
Potential aid available to refugees at that time (aside from their own efforts) was through 
VOLAGs, which operated using self-generated resources.98  
Post-World War II America, however, saw a looming crush of “displaced persons” 
(the term used to describe refugees at that time) migrating from Europe. By that time, the 
American core value of economic self-sufficiency and achievement through personal effort 
without reliance on the assistance of others had permeated the developing body of U.S. 
immigration law, rendering ineligible for acceptance any immigrant who could not show 
any means of support, as “likely to become a public charge.”99 To overcome this 
ineligibility, the first federal-VOLAG partnership was initiated, titled the “Corporate 
Affidavit Program of 1946.”100 Though no federal monies were [directly] involved, the 
program essentially qualified for admission otherwise ineligible displaced persons on the 
written promise of financial support from the VOLAGs.101  
Direct federal funding to VOLAGs followed ten years later, when the government 
began providing “modest financial assistance … for [refugee] health care and 
transportation costs.”102 Though the government notified VOLAGs that “the payments do 
not constitute a precedent for giving payment to the voluntary agencies for similar costs 
for other refugee movements,” this admonition proved false, as federal funding of 
VOLAGs grew significantly—through refugee crisis after crisis—over the course of the 
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next fifty years.103 By the time the Refugee Act of 1980 became law, the relationship 
between the federal government and VOLAGs had evolved to become the cornerstone of 
refugee admission and resettlement programs.  
Viewed in hindsight, it seems absurd to believe that once the partnership was 
established, it would –or even could—be at some point discontinued. The partnership 
between the federal government and the VOLAGs grew and solidified out of necessity. As 
the United States saw more and more refugee populations seeking resettlement in the 
desired U.S., and the U.S. accepted the mantle of world leader in refugee acceptance and 
resettlement, it was simply not feasible not to continue the relationship with the VOLAGs. 
VOLAGs had the organizational framework already in place or expertise in creating and 
expanding to the size necessary to accommodate the circumstances in which the U.S. found 
itself. The timing was also problematic. Any attempt to create a purely federal refugee 
resettlement program in 1950s post-World War II America would have been viewed as too 
much growth of government and federal involvement, contrary to American values of 
minimal government and aversion to a welfare state in a time of rapid economic growth 
and opportunity. For those reasons, the public-private enterprise model created out of 
necessity continues as the essential construct for refugee resettlement programs.  
C. THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 
On March 17, 1980, President James “Jimmy” Carter signed into law Public Law 
96-212, otherwise known as the Refugee Act of 1980.104 The legislative history of the Act 
notes that its goal was to resolve identified inadequacies in the practice of crafting 
programs in response to specific crises.105 Prior to the Act, federal law treated refugee 
issues as extraordinary events rather than as an unfortunate permanent reality, and largely 
focused on refugees who fled Communist regimes in Asia and Eastern Europe.106 The Act 
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was the result of a concerted effort by the federal government to pull together under one 
single piece of legislation the myriad, disparate threads of its many refugee policies and 
practices. It reinforced and formalized the public-private framework for the United States’ 
refugee admission program and established the core principles and goals for the nation’s 
refugee resettlement program. The purpose of the Refugee Act was explicit: “to provide a 
permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special 
humanitarian concern to the United States, and to provide comprehensive and uniform 
provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are 
admitted” [emphasis added].107   
1. Words Matter: Absorption versus Integration 
The use of the word “absorption,” as opposed to “integration,” in the Refugee Act 
is intentional and significant. In the five years preceding passage of the Act, as a result of 
the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam, Americans witnessed unprecedented 
numbers of refugees fleeing Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam by boat, thousands of whom 
would eventually seek and be accepted for resettlement in the United States.108 In 1979, at 
the peak of this Indochinese diaspora, fully 200,000 refugees entered the U.S. as 
refugees.109 The extraordinary volume of refugees arriving and in need of resettlement 
assistance, coupled with the fact that the bulk of this refugee population was of Asiatic 
ethnicity with a greater cultural divide than previous waves of European refugees, 
undoubtedly played a role in the determinations of language in the Act. “Absorb” is defined 
as “to swallow up the identity or individuality of.”110 Conversely, “integrate,” by contrast, 
means “to form, coordinate, or blend into a functioning or unified whole.”111 Words 
matter, and the verbiage in the Act underscores the tacit fear that this and future refugee 
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populations would be less likely to hold core values that align with traditional American 
beliefs. To assert the dominance and importance of these beliefs, the expectation for the 
resettlement programs created by the Act was not integration; it was absorption. Further, 
as the three major component programs mandated by Section 412(a) of the Refugee Act 
demonstrate, refugees were—are—expected to be absorbed quickly into their respective 
communities.112 
2. Deeds Matter: Three Programs Mandated by the Refugee Act of 1980 
Section 412(a) of the Refugee Act requires the Director of Health and Human 
Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) to fund three specific domestic 
resettlement programs.113 The first is “employment training and placement in order [for 
resettled refugees] to achieve economic self-sufficiency among refugees as quickly as 
possible.”114 The intentional placement of this program as the first component of refugee 
resettlement programs underscores the importance of employment as essential prerequisite 
for economic self-sufficiency and an overt assertion of the adoption of that American core 
value by refugees. The addition of “as quickly as possible” emphasizes and reinforces the 
importance the United States places on refugees swiftly achieving economic self-
sufficiency.  
Again, this is important when viewed in context. The language of the Refugee Act 
of 1980 was informed by refugee crises affecting the nation at that time and designed to 
anticipate and manage future refugee migration events that, as had become evident, might 
occur with any population in any location. The Act set an annual cap of 50,000 refugee 
admissions—a response to the increasingly high numbers of refugees being resettled in the 
United States in the late 1970s.115 However, in an effort to encourage global uniformity, 
the Act also adopted the United Nation’s broad definition of “refugee.”116 This broad 
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definition of refugee constrained the U.S.’s ability to selectively identify refugee 
populations for resettlement, which prior to the Act were statutorily limited to refugees 
from Communist or Middle Eastern countries.117 The inability to ensure refugees’ socio-
economic values mirror those of the U.S. required the inclusion of language in the Act that 
essentially compels refugees to live those values. Nothing suggests “pulling yourself up by 
your own bootstraps” quite like “achieve economic self-sufficiency … as quickly as 
possible.”118 
The second program mandate requires that ORR “provide refugees with the 
opportunity to acquire sufficient English language training to enable them to become 
effectively resettled as quickly as possible.”119 This mandate recognizes not only the 
importance of communicating with others in the English language as a key component in 
effective resettlement, but also (tacitly) that refugees should no longer be considered 
temporarily in the U.S.120 Indeed, the Refugee Act of 1980 clarified refugees’ legal status 
in the U.S. and established a specific timeline in which they must petition to adjust their 
status to lawful permanent resident.121 Acknowledging that increasingly diverse 
populations of refugees were now to be admitted with a presumption of permanence and 
provided a clear pathway that would ultimately lead to U.S. citizenship, it is understandable 
that a major component of resettlement would focus on English-language education.  
Basic familiarity with the English language is a requirement for most lawful 
permanent residents seeking to become citizens of the United States, premised on the belief 
that English language ability is a necessary prerequisite for immigrants to “better assimilate 
and take full advantage of the economic and occupational opportunities in the United 
States.”122 History had demonstrated that newly-arrived immigrants often gravitated to 
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their own ethnic enclaves in the U.S. and communicated exclusively in their native 
tongue.123 Doing so, however, frustrated and oftentimes even prevented the desired 
absorption of those populations into mainstream America. Notwithstanding frequent 
references to America as a diverse “melting pot” of cultures, it has long been the goal of 
U.S. immigration law and policies to supplant immigrant values and beliefs with those of 
its native population, creating a homogeneity of values, if not of cultures.124 More than 
just a programmatic tool to ensure refugees do not become long-term public charges, the 
requirement to provide English language training is a signal to both VOLAGs and refugees 
of the expectation of willing participation in the process of becoming an American.  
The third program required by the Refugee Act of 1980 “insure [s] that cash 
assistance is made available to refugees in such a manner as not to discourage their 
economic self-sufficiency.”125 This unsubtle admonition that aid be limited so as “not to 
discourage their economic self-sufficiency” makes clear that refugees are expected to 
secure gainful employment and become economically self-sufficient as quickly as possible 
after arrival.126 Accordingly, the sums provided to refugees are both small and time-
limited. Refugees receive cash assistance in two forms: a one-time benefit of $2,125 per 
refugee from the State Department upon arrival in the United States designed to cover 
initial housing expenses and other essentials, and a relatively small monthly stipend termed 
“Refugee Cash Assistance” (RCA), ranging from $335 for able-bodied refugees, to $685 
for a refugee family of four, with an additional $70 per family member above four 
members, for no more than eight months.127  
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It was not always this way. The monthly cash assistance provided in 1980 after 
passage of the Act was extended for thirty-six months.128 Shortly thereafter, in 1982, the 
time frame was reduced to eighteen months, and, in 1991, further reduced to eight 
months.129 The reductions were part of a broader government effort to reduce welfare 
program expenditures rather than any specific effort to target refugees.130 Refugee cash 
assistance will be explored in greater detail in a subsequent chapter, but it is worth noting 
that reductions in federal cash assistance have put additional pressure on local community 
and state agencies and resettlement agencies—and certainly the refugees themselves—to 
find alternate assistance and have made the push for economic self-sufficiency more 
urgent.   
D. CURRENT FEDERAL RESETTLEMENT MEASURES 
Despite its claim to being “a nation of immigrants,” the United States has never 
established any nationally-administered immigrant integration system, leaving integration 
to the states, or more often, local community “grassroots” efforts.131 Virtually all federal 
regulation and oversight regarding immigration concerns immigration policy and 
procedures, the outward-looking focus being on which immigrants to offer entry to and 
how many, not inward-looking integration considerations, once admitted.132 Refugee 
resettlement, however, is different: “Refugee services are a notable outlier and the only 
example of the federal government playing a role in integration.”133  
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Such a situation seems incongruous with immigration arrival data. The U.S. 
Department of State issued 533,557 immigrant visas in 2018.134 By comparison, refugee 
admissions for that same year were only 22,491, barely four percent of the volume of 
immigrant visas issued.135 With such a comparatively small volume entering the U.S., why 
do refugees merit this special federal attention? The resettlement program exists because 
refugees gain entry to the U.S. via a humanitarian program that essentially removes the 
majority of requirements that other immigrants who obtain visas must satisfy, such as 
family reunification, educational program or employment acceptance, a lack of criminal 
history, and a showing of sufficient financial resources (or sponsorship) to ensure they will 
not become a public charge. Essentially, by virtue of their receipt of an immigrant visa, 
those individuals have already been vetted and are able and expected to integrate with little 
or no governmental assistance. Conversely, refugee admission is a purely humanitarian 
effort that places no eligibility requirement on the refugee beyond meeting the definition 
of refugee. The stark differences between traditional immigration and refugee admission 
illuminates the need for a nationally-orchestrated refugee resettlement program. That 
federal role takes the form of statutory and fiscal oversight of three types of assistance 
provided to refugees: cash, medical care, and certain social services.136 Figure 2, provided 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, offers a simplified graphical 
overview of the resettlement process and the assistance available to refugees.137  
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Figure 2. Refugee Resettlement Process in the U.S.138 
1. Financial Assistance 
The amount of financial assistance refugees receive varies greatly and is dependent 
on many factors, but begins with a reception and placement grant from the Department of 
State of $2,125 per refugee, to cover initial housing, food, and clothing expenses for three 
months upon arrival to the U.S.139 During those three months, refugees are instructed to 
apply for state-administered but federally-reimbursed Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) 
payments.140 RCA payments last no more than eight months, though there is language in 
the law that suggests the period can be extended, depending on determinations of need and 
eligibility.141 It should also be noted that the DOS reception and placement grant of $2,125 
per refugee is paid directly to the local resettlement agency, not the refugee, and $725 of 
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each refugee’s grant can be retained by the local resettlement agency as an offset to their 
administrative costs.142 
Finally, some financial assistance provided to refugees is not a gift. The Refugee 
Travel Loan program provides funds to defray the costs to refugees of travel to the United 
States.143 The average travel loan is $1,100 per refugee, for which refugees must sign a 
promissory note and agree to repay over five years, beginning six months after 
resettlement.144 
2. Medical Assistance 
While refugees must undergo an overseas medical examination as part of the 
acceptance process, refugees ultimately accepted for resettlement must also undergo a 
health assessment within ninety days of arrival in the country, the cost of which is borne 
by the federal government.145 This important assessment, however, is routinely performed 
by agencies that do not provide ongoing or subsequent care, and the results may not be 
known or shared with the refugee themselves.146 Consequently, important health 
information obtained from refugees at pre- and post-resettlement medical examinations 
may “fall through the cracks” and never reach primary health care professionals from 
which refugees seek health care and assistance.  
Additionally, as part of their resettlement, refugees are provided access to free or 
reduced-cost medical care through one of two medical assistance programs: one specific 
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to refugees, the other available to all qualified residents and citizens.147 Refugees who 
meet eligibility requirements are immediately able to receive Medicaid coverage, though 
as with the financial RCA, the refugee must apply for this benefit at the state level.148 For 
refugees who aren’t eligible for Medicaid coverage due to age, disability, or family 
composition, ORR offers the Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) program, which 
provides coverage generally similar to Medicaid.149 However, concomitant with the 
shortened time frame for RCA, the eligibility period for the RMA was also reduced to eight 
months, viewed at the time as a welfare program that discouraged self-sufficiency rather 
than as a transitional aid.150  
Both programs suffer from a lack of adequate funding. Refugees have a higher 
incidence of maladies such as tuberculosis, hepatitis, and intestinal parasites, not to 
mention mental health challenges, as a result of the traumatic events surrounding their 
forced displacement.151 Further, most refugees must use an interpreter to discuss their 
medical concerns with their treating physician.152 These refugee-specific issues are not 
adequately contemplated by Medicaid’s standard reimbursement fee schedule; 
consequently, many refugees find it difficult to obtain adequate health care services.153 
Eligibility for a health care program is of little value, if the refugee cannot find a suitably 
capable and willing provider. 
3. Social Services 
Refugees are provided access to state-sponsored, but federally-reimbursed social 
services, such as child day care, citizenship and naturalization assistance, interpretation and 
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translator services, among other things.154 However, the principal social services 
highlighted by ORR are employability services—job training programs, interviewing 
assistance, and employment retention skills training.155 The focus, as outlined in the 
Refugee Act, remains on ensuring employment of refugees, so they become economically 
self-sufficient as quickly as possible.156  
As with any health care and financial assistance program provided by the 
government, detractors have asserted such assistance programs are welfare efforts that 
allow refugees to defer or avoid entirely their obligation to become economically self-
sufficient.157 As a result, programs saw reduced funding or were shuttered entirely, 
resulting in refugees experiencing lengthier wait times for those programs that remained 
open, to include language and job training programs.158 The impact these reductions have 
on refugees is undoubtedly harmful and potentially negatively impacts the refugees’ view 
of the values of patriotism and loyalty to the nation we are attempting to promote. The 
dichotomous narrative of being told that it is imperative to find employment and achieve 
economic self-sufficiency, while simultaneously being told the already inadequate 
financial and medical assistance is time limited and programs designed to help meet the 
goals imposed are either no longer available or delayed, as they are considered an 
unnecessary crutch. 
E. RESETTLEMENT LOCATION DETERMINATIONS 
The discussion thus far has focused on services provided to refugees once resettled 
in their new communities. Before that happens, however, the decision must be made as to 
where each refugee will be resettled. The process of refugee resettlement in the U.S. begins 
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with the assignment of each refugee to one of the nine VOLAGs.159 Each week, at a 
meeting of representatives of the nine VOLAGs, information regarding refugees approved 
for resettlement but pending location decisions is reviewed and refugees divided into one 
of two groups: those who have family members already living the U.S. and those who do 
not.160 If a refugee has noted in their application or during their interview overseas that 
they have family already established in the United States, this information is considered 
the dominant factor in determining that refugee’s prospective resettlement location.  
The VOLAG with long-standing contractual relationships with the sponsoring 
agency or agencies in the refugee relative’s community is assigned responsibility for that 
particular refugee’s case.161 The VOLAG then assigns that local resettlement agency direct 
oversight of the integration process for the refugee.162 The local sponsor agency is the 
critical formative organization in the resettlement process, as it is responsible for directly 
coordinating and overseeing the specific integration programs and other assistance. This 
location assignment methodology is appropriate, as it ensures that newly-arrived refugees 
benefit from the efforts their family members have already undertaken to establish 
themselves in their respective communities. Research on the issue of refugee resettlement 
has shown the benefits of having a ready network of family and friends with experience 
and knowledge of the community to assist and support newly-arrived refugees as they 
navigate their new environment.163  
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F. “FREE CASE” REFUGEES 
Refugees who have no family ties to the U.S. are considered “free case” 
refugees.164 The VOLAG assigned oversight for a free case refugee makes the 
determination where to resettle the refugee based on an assessment of several factors. Aside 
from a review of the information contained in the refugee’s file provided to the VOLAG, 
there is no interaction with the refugee, nor does the refugee enjoy any participation in the 
location selection process. The VOLAG’s network of local organizations with which it 
affiliates, and those organizations’ capacity for sponsorship, financial support, resource 
availability and employment opportunities are the key factors in making location 
determinations.165 As a result, most free case refugees learn they are to be resettled in 
locations that have immediately available employment opportunities, most often in low-
skilled, menial positions. Unlike refugees with family support already in the U.S., free case 
refugees are dependent on their local resettlement agency for support, as they seek to find 
their footing in the United States. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The Refugee Act of 1980 formalized existing refugee resettlement efforts and 
provides a standardized “roadmap” for future refugee migration to the United States. It 
was, and still is, the single most significant legislation concerning refugees ever enacted. 
Unfortunately, the Act’s single-minded focus on economic self-sufficiency as the sole 
measure of successful integration, yet undermining that goal through the erosion over time 
of many of the Act’s component programs through funding reductions, has worked to 
render the Act a hollow and largely ineffective effort in achieving true refugee integration. 
True integration must necessarily include the adoption of American core values and a 
deeply-held sense of loyalty and patriotism to the United States. These goals become 
elusive and perhaps even impossible to achieve in an environment where assistance of any 
kind—financial, medical, and social—is insufficient in quantity, quality and duration. 
Comprehensive integration is particularly difficult for free case refugees, who have no 
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familial connection to the United States nor any say in the selection of their resettlement 
location. They are the most in need of effective resettlement assistance, and current 
implementation of the provisions of the Refugee Act of 1980 does not provide for that 
needed level of assistance.  
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III. OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES TO REFUGEE 
INTEGRATION 
Refugees resettled in the United States by USRAP arrive with little more than the 
clothes on their backs and whatever few possessions can be packed in a single suitcase.166 
Whatever socioeconomic status a refugee may have enjoyed prior in their native country, 
for the great majority, the realities of forced migration—leaving their homes often in 
haste—and the toll of oftentimes years of displacement living in refugee camps prior to 
resettlement, reduce them to poverty.167 As a group, however, refugees eventually achieve 
levels of success in benchmark measures such as labor force participation rates exceeding 
those of the total U.S. population, inclusive of immigrants and native-born Americans.168 
By 2018, of refugees who arrived in the United States between 1987 and 1996, forty-one 
percent owned homes and attained a median personal income of $28,000.169 In 
comparison, the median personal income that same year for the total U.S. population was 
$23,000 and the percentage who owned homes was thirty-seven percent.170 By traditional 
measures of success, it would appear refugees have, by and large, expertly navigated the 
roadmap of resettlement to a satisfactory result.  
With such apparent success, why should there be any need to consider revising the 
current refugee resettlement system? Because looks can be deceiving and notwithstanding 
these metrics, it must be understood that refugees are distinctly different from other 
immigrants and face unique challenges that must be overcome, in order to successfully 
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integrate in the U.S. Those challenges are not solely the requirements imposed upon 
refugees as a condition of their resettlement. They are also the product of the circumstances 
surrounding each refugee’s journey to the United States, as well. This chapter will explore 
the challenges refugees face in resettling to a new country.  
A. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CHALLENGES  
Living as a refugee changes a person. Some manifestations are obvious, some less 
so. Refugees arrive in the United States with a greater likelihood of suffering from a variety 
of physical issues.171 Living in close proximity to others in camps with limited access to 
adequate health care and poor sanitation puts refugees at risk for gastrointestinal parasites 
and a greater susceptibility to infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis and hepatitis.172 As 
one example, it is estimated globally 3.5 million refugees suffer from chronic or acute 
Hepatitis B, which compromises liver function and is potentially life-threatening.173 Of 
over 6,000 Bhutanese, Burmese, and Iraqi refugees in the United States screened between 
2006 and 2011, 20.7 percent had current or past Hepatitis B infections, and of that number, 
5.7 percent had chronic, acute Hepatitis B.174 Likewise, high rates of tuberculosis—a 
potentially fatal infectious disease if left untreated—were noted in refugees from Tibet, 
Burma, Ethiopia and Liberia.175 Though pre- and post-resettlement health screenings 
address many of the physical maladies of refugees, refugees must still contend with 
generally poorer health than other immigrants in a new and unfamiliar network of health 
services, with the added impediment of language barriers. 
Physical health is but one aspect of a refugee’s overall health picture. Mental health 
is also a significant issue in refugee communities. Though refugees have applied for 
resettlement, it must be understood that their migration from their native country was not 
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of their choosing and often violently imposed upon the refugees. As a result of the traumatic 
events that led to their initial flight from their homes and countries, often exacerbated by 
years of marginalization spent in refugee camps or other austere environments before 
resettling in the United States, many refugees exhibit symptoms of psychosocial trauma, 
PTSD, depression and anxiety at higher levels than other immigrant populations—as high 
as thirty percent for refugees.176 Post-resettlement stressors—language barriers, 
acculturative difficulties, employment pressure, weak social networks, and others—further 
compound the problem, making refugees more susceptible to mental health issues.177   
These problems are particularly prevalent in resettled free case “first wave” 
refugees resettled in less urban settings, in which the local resettlement organization serves 
as the refugees’ sole support network. Mental health treatment for these issues has been 
inadequate, for the most part, as it is not part of USRAP’s programmatic priority of meeting 
the immediate physical needs of refugees. Additionally, the “honeymoon” period of 
euphoria experienced by refugees in the first few weeks after resettlement can mask 
underlying mental health issues that manifest months or even years later.178 
Whether a refugee has fled their country after suffering specific and direct violence 
against them, or rather left upon “seeing the writing on the wall,” before harm could come 
to them and their family, the refugee has experienced a loss of control over their own future 
and fate. That is a major disruptive event and paradigm shift that informs a refugee’s 
actions and responses going forward in the resettlement and integration process. That 
simple understanding must be factored into any integration plan, in order to ensure a true 
and lasting successful integration.179 
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B. RESETTLEMENT PROCESS PRESSURE  
1. Refugee Travel Loan Repayment Obligation 
Even before resettling in the United States, many refugees find themselves 
financially obligated to the United States. As noted in the previous chapter, once accepted 
for resettlement, but prior to their travel to the U.S., all refugees over the age of 18 are 
required to sign a promissory note acknowledging their repayment obligation to reimburse 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for the costs associated with their travel 
to the U.S.180 For many refugees, repayment of the travel loan is yet another financial 
stressor, as they contend with other financial pressures to pay rent, put food on the table, 
and cover other living expenses for which refugees are responsible once short-term limited 
cash assistance is no longer provided. As one Syrian refugee struggling with meeting the 
obligations of her travel loan repayment observed, “When you don’t have much, it’s hard 
to pay for anything.”181  
As of March 2019, eighteen percent of refugees who had received travel loans in 
2016 had not made any payments toward that debt.182 Loan forgiveness is rare and 
unavailable in instances of inability to pay.183 Failure to make payments towards this debt, 
just as with other consumer debts, results in reporting to credit agencies and aggressive 
collection efforts, further impeding a refugee’s ability to attain economic self-sufficiency 
and positive sentiment towards their resettlement experience.184  
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As part of IOM’s oversight of the travel loan program, local resettlement agencies 
involved in collecting loan repayments are allowed to retain twenty-five percent of the 
amount collected.185 This money is separate and apart from other funding streams and is 
not an insignificant sum. In 2017, over $66 million was recovered in loan repayments, with 
over $14 million of that total going to the resettlement agencies.186 With such a direct 
financial incentive, resettlement agencies have a strong vested interest in ensuring the 
refugees they oversee repay their travel loans. Though there is no evidence to suggest 
resettlement agencies place undue pressure on refugees to accept rapid employment over 
suitable employment, as part of ensuring repayment of travel loans, the optics of having 
the same agency responsible for providing resettlement assistance also responsible for 
collecting a debt owed by those same refugees are troubling.  
If we hope to craft effective and durable resettlement strategies that facilitate 
comprehensive integration and, as seems evident, the refugee travel loan program will 
continue, it would be advisable and appropriate to provide refugees more time to begin 
paying off that debt, as well as a longer term of repayment to lessen the monthly financial 
impact. This would allow refugees to focus on what matters most—establishing a solid 
foothold in this country, which might, in turn, engender in refugees a stronger sense of 
loyalty towards this nation and their communities.   
2. Inconsistencies in Local Resettlement Program Services 
For refugees, in particular free case refugees who have no established familial ties 
in the U.S. and thus face greater integration challenges, the quality and extent of care 
provided by the local sponsoring agency are perhaps the most consequential factors in a 
refugee’s successful integration, more so even than resettlement location. Unfortunately, 
as a result of prioritization of the goal of economic self-sufficiency, local resettlement 
services “struggle to help refugees meet basic self-sufficiency goals and are inadequate in 
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addressing comprehensive wellbeing and service needs.”187 Additionally, as noted in the 
previous chapter, inequities in service provision by local resettlement organizations result 
in some refugees receiving more and better assistance than others.188  
In the absence of a national standard of care, local organizations will continue to 
negotiate the assistance they provide, and the quality of service will largely be dictated by 
available community resources, as well as the local agency’s ability to marshal available 
resources in support of refugee integration.189 Disparities in both breadth and depth of 
resettlement programming will likely become more pronounced as refugee resettlement 
continues to move away from urban centers to more rural areas.190 This shift has placed 
more pressure on rural communities—many of whom have little experience with foreign 
residents and are unprepared for an influx of refugees.191  
C. COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE  
Up to this point, the discussion regarding integration has focused on the ability of 
refugees to become part of their communities and the nation as a whole, principally through 
programs and services either provided or coordinated by their resettlement agency. This is 
certainly the mechanism through which the process of integration is initiated, but, 
ultimately, integration is as much about the community’s societal reaction to its newest 
residents, as it is about resettlement program delivery.192 Integration is the shared 
responsibility of refugees and their communities, and, ultimately, how each community 
reacts and interacts with resettled refugees will greatly influence the refugee’s integration 
success.193  
                                                 
187 Shaw and Poulin, “Findings.” 
188 Lunn, “Displaced and Disillusioned” 
189 Government Accountability Office, Refugee Resettlement. 
190 Zong, Fix, and Hooper, How Are Refugees Faring? 
191 Government Accountability Office, Refugee Resettlement. 
192 Rinus Penninx, “Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State,” Migration 




In general, Americans remain supportive of the concept of refugee resettlement in 
principle.194 However, that support falters when an individual’s own community is 
identified as a potential refugee resettlement location.195 This “not-in-my-backyard” 
(NIMBY) syndrome appears to be influenced heavily by negativity bias and media framing 
of refugees as potential threats to national security and drains on public assistance 
programs.196 In 1946, as the first waves of the exodus of refugees from Eastern Europe 
began to reach the United States, Senator Chapman Revercomb (R-WV), noted, “it would 
be a tragic blunder to bring into our midst those imbued with a communistic line of thought, 
when one of the most important tasks of this Government today is to combat and eradicate 
communism from this country.”197 Clearly, such fears surrounding refugees are hardly 
new. 
The reality of refugee resettlement’s impact on communities is far different from 
that characterization. Communities experience a plethora of benefits by accepting refugees, 
from an enriched cultural diversity to economic stimulation by new residents living, 
working, and shopping in the community.198 These benefits, however, come at a cost to 
communities. Refugees may require additional service provisions not covered by the 
federal government or the local resettlement agency, such as interpreter services for schools 
and medical care.199 Though some programs and grant money may be available to offset 
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these costs, communities that are ill-prepared for an influx of refugees may not be aware 
of this potential assistance and end up shouldering the costs themselves.200 In such an 
event, the fears that refugees will disproportionately require public assistance would be 
realized, and community attitudes might shift and members discontinue further 
interaction.201 Any loss of existing and potential social bridges could affect negative a 
refugee’s integration progress.  
Community acceptance is not solely a matter of the residents’ views towards 
refugees. As was previously discussed, suitability and proportionality are key 
considerations in assessing a community’s ability to accept refugees.202 Suitability 
concerns the community’s views towards refugees and resettlement, in general; 
proportionality considers the community’s resources and social identity, to determine a 
“tipping point” figure—the number of refugees that a community can resettle without 
compromising service or changing the perceived cultural identity of the community.203 
When either of these tolerances is exceeded, problems ensue, and refugees become 
unwelcome. 
In 2007, Fort Wayne, Indiana, experienced a three-fold increase in its annual 
refugee acceptance numbers, overwhelming community resources and resulting in city 
officials issuing a moratorium on refugee resettlement the following year.204 
Acknowledging that the local resettlement organizations had been diligent in their efforts 
in the initial months following the refugees’ arrival, city officials complained that after 
those first few months, the burden of care fell to the local community.205 More recently, 
in March 2017, the State of Tennessee—which withdrew from participation in the USRAP 
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in 2008—filed suit against the federal government, asserting federal overreach in the 
continuing resettlement of refugees in Tennessee, despite reductions in federal funding 
since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.206 That lawsuit was dismissed by the U.S. 
6th Circuit Court of Appeals on July 24, 2019, but a Petition for Rehearing was filed by 
Tennessee on September 6, 2019.207 Though the grounds claimed for filing the petition 
assert the decision is contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, it is notable that the 
petition was filed shortly after news media reported President Trump was preparing a draft 
order that would authorize refugee resettlement only in cities and states that consent to the 
resettlement.208  
As communities gain more ability to dictate the terms of their participation in 
refugee resettlement, it becomes incumbent on national and local resettlement 
organizations to ensure greater coordination—and conversation—with those communities. 
Every refugee’s resettlement programs end, and once that happens, refugees must seek out 
and find the assistance they require in the community-at-large. This task is more easily 
accomplished in a community that views refugees in a favorable light and willingly 
engages with their refugees. 
D. SECONDARY MIGRATION 
The final arbiter of the value and effectiveness of any refugee resettlement program 
is, of course, the refugees themselves. Extended and engaged programs may still be viewed 
as inadequate for their needs by certain refugees, just as a “bare bones” program with 
minimal assistance and interaction may be viewed as perfectly sufficient by other refugees. 
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Regardless of the quality of the program, if a refugee feels underserved and unsupported 
in their resettlement location, they may respond by leaving for a perceived better 
environment—traditionally to locations with large ethnically similar populations.209 The 
United States admitted a total of 128,164 refugees during Fiscal years 2012 and 2013.210 
Approximately 21,000 (16.3 percent) of those refugees relocated to other communities 
within a year of their arrival.211 This rate of out migration has grown steadily over the past 
35 years.212 
It would be unfair and untrue to suggest that all 21,000 refugees left their initial 
resettlement location within a year of arrival as a result of negative resettlement 
experiences. Secondary migration occurs for a variety of reasons. Indeed, the majority of 
refugees who engaged in secondary migration left their original resettlement location for 
economic and other reasons unrelated to the quality of resettlement services—pursuing 
better paying jobs, more affordable housing, proximity to similar ethnic populations.213 
As Eleanor Ott, with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) observed, “[E]conomic self-sufficiency is a key goal in the U.S. resettlement 
system, and, ironically, often achieved outside of the system.”214  
Regardless of a refugee’s reasons for leaving their place of original resettlement, 
once gone, they lose the assistance guaranteed to them by the USRAP, via their local 
resettlement agency.215 Certain state-administered federal programs, such as Medicaid, 
can potentially be transferred to a new location, but, for the most part, refugees “fall off 
the radar” and must navigate by themselves their path to resettlement, without the safety 
                                                 
209 Eleanor Ott, “Get Up and Go: Refugee Resettlement and Secondary Migration in the USA,” 
research paper no. 219 (research paper, UNHCR, September 2019). 
210 Migration Policy Institute, “U.S. Annual Refugee Resettlement Ceilings.” 
211 Bloem and Loveridge, “Secondary Migration.” 
212 Bloem and Loveridge. 
213 Bloem and Loveridge. 
214 Ott, “Get Up and Go.” 
215 Forrest and Brown, “Organization-Led Migration.” 
51 
net of organizational oversight.216 This is particularly troubling in instances where 
refugees decide to leave their resettlement location because of a negative or inadequate 
resettlement. The better the resettlement effort provided to refugees, the more they will feel 
engaged and a part of their community, presumably making secondary migration less 
prevalent. 
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IV. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM CASE STUDIES 
As has been discussed, the nine VOLAGs hold a key function in refugee 
resettlement. Once approved for resettlement in the United States, VOLAGs determine 
where each refugee will be resettled.217 However, once a refugee is physically placed in a 
resettlement location designated by their assigned VOLAG, the task of direct oversight and 
implementation of the resettlement process falls to a local, non-governmental resettlement 
organizations (NGOs), working under a contractual arrangement with the VOLAG.218 
These affiliate NGOs translate the broad resettlement program goals of the VOLAGs and 
USRAP into specific, implementable programs.  
As might be expected, NGOs vary greatly in the level and quality of support and 
involvement provided.219 The potential to be assigned to an agency with substandard 
resettlement programs may be of lesser concern for refugees with familial sponsors in the 
United States, but it is particularly problematic in free case refugee resettlement, who have 
no existing familial support network in their resettlement location and must rely on 
assistance from their local resettlement organizations.220 Considering the circumstances 
that have led to their displacement and eventual resettlement, it is understandable that 
refugees are more comfortable seeking assistance in navigating their new environments 
from members of their own ethnic community, over resettlement agencies and community 
organizations.221  
This chapter examines two domestic resettlement programs in engaged 
communities that have shown success in reducing secondary migration and improving 
refugees’ overall satisfaction with their resettlement progress. Additionally, as a national 
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program similar to the United States that makes local resettlement location determinations 
for refugees, Denmark’s resettlement program will be reviewed for specific practices that 
could potentially be incorporated into the U.S. national resettlement program. As with the 
domestic programs examined, the focus will not be solely on the metric of reduced 
secondary migration—indeed, in the Danish model, no such secondary self-migration is 
even permitted for three years, so any measurement based on that metric would be of no 
value—but rather on the refugees’ perceptions and satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their 
resettlement.  
A. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
1. Demographics 
Utah is a state in the mountainous western United States, covering almost eighty-
five thousand square miles.222 The state is predominantly rural, with a total population in 
2019 of 2.9 million.223 With a recorded population of 200,591 in 2019, Salt Lake City is 
not only the capital of Utah, but also the most populous city in the state of Utah.224 That 
population of Salt Lake City is dominantly White (73.68 percent), followed by Hispanic 
(12.82 percent), Asian (5.37 percent) and African-American (2.02 percent).225 As of the 
2017 U.S. Census 5-Year Survey, 4.6 percent of residents were unemployed.226 Though 
Utah was established as a religious haven by settlers of The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (LDS), or Mormons, and Salt Lake City is the seat of that faith, by 2018, 
Salt Lake County’s 558,607 Mormon church-enrolled residents were in the minority (48.91 
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percent) of the county’s population of 1,142,077.227 Notwithstanding that decline, the LDS 
faith is still the largest religious affiliation in Utah and Salt Lake City. 
2. Refugees in Salt Lake City, Utah 
Utah has been a resettlement destination for refugees for over forty years.228 From 
2006 to 2017, the state accepted for resettlement, on average, 1,100 refugees annually, as 
part of the USRAP.229 As of 2019, approximately 65,000 refugees from forty countries 
live in Utah, with the majority living in Salt Lake County.230 The seven largest refugee 
populations come from Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, Iraq, Vietnam, 
Burma, and the former Soviet Union.231 Utah’s receptiveness towards refugees is likely 
due in no small part to the state’s own history of settlement by Mormon pioneers, who fled 
New York and Illinois after suffering persecution for their religious beliefs.232 With such 
a history, it is not difficult to see why providing a safe and opportune space for others 
suffering similarly is of such importance to the community.  
3. Resettlement Programs 
Refugee resettlement services in Salt Lake City, Utah, are provided by two 
organizations. Utah’s first refugee resettlement organization was Catholic Community 
Services (CCS), who, though in existence since 1945, began formally assisting refugees in 
1974.233 In 1994, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) established a Salt Lake City 
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office and began providing resettlement services, assisting over 11,000 refugees in that 
time.234  
In 2007, as part of the public-private partnership that oversaw refugee resettlement 
efforts, Utah state government leaders convened a Refugee Working Group to assess the 
state’s refugee resettlement programs.235 That group recognized that the six months of 
resettlement services offered at the time was inadequate to address the needs of most 
refugees, and recommended the creation of a statewide extended refugee case management 
(ECM) system.236 In 2008, the IRC office in Salt Lake City secured private funding to 
develop and implement an extended case management program for refugees that ensured 
programmatic support for a full twenty-four months, well beyond the six-month period of 
oversight provided prior to the implementation of the extended management program.237  
The total funding for Salt Lake City’s refugee ECM pilot project was $925,000, 
comprised of existing $850,000 state and federal funding provided to the IRC for refugee 
resettlement and private donations of $75,000.238 Though something of an 
oversimplification, and acknowledging that a large number of families left the ECM 
program and Utah over the course of the program, that breaks down to an average 
additional cost of $832.58 cost per refugee or $2,131.34 per family over the pre-ECM costs 
of resettlement.  
Salt Lake City’s ECM pilot was implemented in March 2009, serving 1,111 
refugees in 434 families through July 2011, the period used for evaluation purposes.239 
Refugees participating in the ECM came from Bhutan (26.3), Iraq (23.0 percent), Burma 
(21.7 percent), with the remaining twenty-nine percent largely from Eritrea, Somalia, Iran, 
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and Cuba.240 On average, families had been displaced from their home country for ten 
years before resettlement.241 Further, seventy-six of the 434 families participating in the 
ECM engaged in secondary migration before the end of the two-year program in July 2011, 
with fully one-half of those families leaving within the first six months of the program.242 
Families that left cited employment opportunities or family in other locations in the U.S. 
as reasons for leaving.243 
Beyond simply providing case management for a longer period of time, Salt Lake 
City’s ECM was structured to provide more direct, ongoing contact with refugees in the 
program. Through regular home visits—weekly during the first month, monthly for the 
next five months, then quarterly thereafter—caseworkers met with refugees to assist with 
the transition to life in the U.S., as well as monitor the refugees’ overall “wellbeing.”244 
The ECM also limited each caseworker to 30 cases, to ensure caseworkers were able to 
devote the time necessary to provide increased oversight and engagement.245  
To assess the effectiveness of Salt Lake City’s ECM, an interview was conducted 
each quarter and at the conclusion of the 24 months of oversight. Refugees were asked to 
describe and rate on a scale from 1 to five (1 being “very bad,” 2 “bad,” 3 “okay,” 4 “good,” 
and 5 being “very good”) their overall satisfaction in seven aspects of their resettlement: 
overall adjustment, health, employment, finances, education/language, housing, and 
family/community.246 Moreover, refugees were asked to candidly assess the assistance 
provided by the resettlement agency in each of these interviews, to glean some measure of 
the resettlement agency’s responsiveness and value to the resettlement process.247  
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4. Outcomes 
In their first interview, conducted within the first three months of resettlement, 36.1 
percent of refugees assessed their current state of wellbeing and adjustment to the U.S. as 
“bad” or “very bad,” 44.9 percent were “okay,” and 19.0 percent were “good” or “very 
good.”248 However, by the last assessment in the twenty-fourth month, that percentage had 
risen to 91.8 percent of refugees reporting “good” or “very good” adjustment.249 
Employment saw a similar trajectory, with over 80 percent of households initially assessing 
their employment situation (or lack thereof) as “bad” or “very bad,” but by the end of the 
two-years, fully 70.7 percent indicated their employment situation was “good” or “very 
good.”250 Finally, in assessing the quality and value of services provided by the 
resettlement agency, initially ambivalent rankings of “okay” by just over fifty percent of 
the refugees quickly rose to “good” or “very good” among ninety percent of the refugees 
and remained so over the last three quarters of interviews.251 
In sum, in every self-assessed measure save for health, which declined between the 
first and second quarter interviews, over the course of the ECM program, refugees reported 
increasing levels of positivity towards their wellbeing and the work of the resettlement 
agency in each successive interview.252 Of greatest significance, perhaps, is that the 
majority of refugees’ assessments of their own wellbeing did not move from “very bad” or 
“bad” to “good” or “very good” until the 12 to 24 month range, suggesting that the 
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integratory benefits of a robust resettlement program are not realized in the first few months 
after a refugee arrives in the U.S., but subsequent to the first year of arrival.253  
Finally, though it was noted that many families left the program before completion 
of the two years anticipated, the percentage of refugees included in the Salt Lake City ECM 
that engaged in secondary migration within their first twenty-four months of resettlement 
was far lower than the national average of sixty-five percent for refugees—only seventy-
six households, or 17.5 percent, and of that number, most identified employment offers or 
the opportunity to be with relatives elsewhere in the U.S. as their reason for secondary 
migration, not dissatisfaction with the ECM program.254 
5. Findings 
Time, in terms of program duration, is essential to effective resettlement and 
integration. The refugee resettlement ECM program in Salt Lake City, Utah, demonstrates 
that refugee resettlement—and comprehensive sociocultural integration—is a process that 
takes years, not months. Resettlement programs that discontinue services after several 
months may provide sufficient assistance to meet the structural integration goals of 
ensuring refugees are employed, have a place to live, and gain some general familiarity 
with their new environment, but they likely lose the opportunity to facilitate a more 
nuanced and comprehensive integration. Salt Lake City’s refugee resettlement ECM 
identified two years as the time frame necessary to provide comprehensive resettlement 
and integration of the majority of refugees served.  
A second aspect of time—the time a caseworker can spend working with each 
refugee—is also important in ensuring successful resettlement and integration. Salt Lake 
City’s ECM program assigned caseworkers no more than thirty cases each at any given 
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time. This allowed caseworkers to devote sufficient attention and efforts to the needs of 
their assigned refugees, without overloading caseworkers.255 Those needs were identified 
and addressed through regularly scheduled meetings with caseworkers who solicited 
feedback, impressions, and candid self-assessments from the refugees as to their 
resettlement experience and wellbeing. Assigning caseworkers too many cases would have 
made it impossible for caseworkers to maintain the volume and frequency of meetings and 
interviews with their assigned refugees. 
Those interviews demonstrate the third important finding from the study of Salt 
Lake City’s refugee resettlement ECM: the value of listening to the refugee. The simple 
act of asking a refugee their thoughts on how they think they are doing in their new 
environment and how that environment is treating them is incredibly empowering. More 
than just showing concern for the refugees continued wellbeing, it communicates the idea 
that their opinions matter and will inform aspects of their resettlement program going 
forward. The value of these interviews was not lost on the refugees, who expressed high 
levels of satisfaction with the resettlement agency’s efforts over the second year of the 
program.256   
Notwithstanding the high percentage of refugees reporting positive assessments of 
the ECM program and their general wellbeing and adjustment to life in the United States, 
not every refugee achieved comprehensive integration. Neither was the ECM program 
wholly responsible for every refugee success story. Refugees succeed largely on their own 
initiative and vision, and an ECM is not a guarantee of success; it is a tool designed to 
facilitate refugee access to basic assistance. Indeed, at the end of the 24-month period, even 
though the program found secondary migration levels in Salt Lake City were dramatically 
lower than nationwide, refugees held a strongly positive sense of wellbeing, and most of 
the refugees had largely attained economic self-sufficiency, most households were still 
living below the federal poverty line.257 Notwithstanding these concerns, it seems the 
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ECM program continues to be viewed positively by both refugees and the local community. 
As recently as August 2016, the Mormon Church pledged an additional $2 million to assist 
with Salt Lake City’s ECM program and refugee resettlement efforts in Utah.258  
B. UTICA, NEW YORK 
1. Demographics 
Situated in upstate New York, halfway between Buffalo and New York City, Utica 
was a thriving textiles and manufacturing hub in the first half of the 20th century.259 Utica 
achieved a peak population of 100,000 for thirty years, from 1930 through 1960.260 
However, beginning in the 1960s, Utica saw its population begin to decline as many of its 
key industries relocated to southern states.261 By July 2019, Utica, New York’s population 
had fallen to just over 60,000 residents.262 As reported in a 2017 census, a majority 63.4 
percent of Utica residents were White, followed by African-Americans (15.8 percent), and 
Asian (11.9 percent) residents.263 In that same year, Utica’s unemployment rate was 10.8 
percent.264 As of 2019, 37.1 percent of residents identified their religion as Catholic, 
followed by 3.6 percent Methodist, and 1.0 percent Muslim.265 
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2. Refugees in Utica, New York 
The first post-Refugee Act of 1980 refugees came in the early 1980s from Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos, followed by refugees from the former Soviet Union in 1988.266 From 
the early 1990s through 2006, over 4,500 Bosnian refugees resettled in Utica.267 Since 
2000, over 4,000 Burmese refugees, as well as refugees from Iraq, Nepal, Somalia, 
Thailand and Sudan—have resettled in Utica.268 In total, over 16,500 refugees have been 
resettled in Utica since the passage of the Act.269 Currently, refugees make up twelve 
percent of Utica’s 60,000 residents.270  
3. Resettlement Programs  
Refugee resettlement in Utica, New York, is overseen by the Mohawk Valley 
Resource Center for Refugees (MVRCR).271 The MVRCR was founded in 1979 with the 
support and assistance of Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services.272 The Mohawk 
Valley Resource Center for Refugees is a non-profit, privately held company that has an 
annual estimated revenue of $2.5 million dollars and conducts operations with a staff of 
forty-five employees.273 Refugee resettlement services provided by MVRCR include 180 
days of case management (increased from 90 days in 2017), primary care referral, 
assistance with school enrollment and cultural orientation programs covering such topics 
as “Employment,” “Your new community,” “Role of the resettlement agency,” and “U.S. 
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laws.”274 With the limited information available, it was not possible to arrive at a cost per 
refugee for services provided by the MVRCR.  
The formal resettlement programs provided by MVRCR are not particularly unique 
or innovative, nor of greater duration than other resettlement programs nationwide.275 In 
truth, MVRCR offers services that are similar to those offered by other resettlement 
agencies and mandated by the federal government.276 What MVRCR enjoys—and has 
enjoyed for the past thirty years—that other programs lack, however, is an extremely robust 
level of support, financial and social, for refugee resettlement from the residents, business 
community, and government of Utica, Oneida County, and the state of New York. As 
examples, when the federal government moved to reduce funding for refugee resettlement 
organizations as part of the suspension of the refugee resettlement program in 2017, $2 
million in funding was secured from the state of New York for the MVRCR and other 
upstate New York refugee resettlement organizations.277 In July 2018, Oneida County 
received $538,893 from the Central New York Care Collaborative to improve healthcare 
services for the local refugee population.278 And in September 2019, despite significant 
decreases in refugee admissions nationwide and a commensurate loss of federal funding, 
MVRCR was able to secure public and private funding to open a new “state-of-the-art 
community space and training center” for refugees.279 This prevailing positive view 
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creates a climate in which refugees can flourish and the community willingly assumes 
responsibility for the care, support, and integration of those refugees. 
4. Outcomes 
The city of Utica has certainly benefited from its willingness to participate in the 
resettlement of refugees. Unlike other upstate New York communities that continue to lose 
population, Utica has seen modest population increases over the past decade, and refugees 
have revitalized the local economy and reestablished neighborhoods that were previously 
in states of decay.280 What began with the Bosnian refugee migration in the late 1990s 
continued, even as the refugee groups resettling in Utica changed. In the past fifteen years, 
Somali Bantus, Burmese, and refugees from Pakistan and Iraq have changed significantly 
the demography of Utica, but the positive impact made by earlier refugees carried over to 
these newer refugee populations.281  
Judging by the numbers, it seems that refugees are coming to and remaining in 
Utica. As of 2017, the percentage of Utica residents that are foreign-born was 19.4 
percent.282 Even some refugees originally resettled in other locations in the United States 
have secondarily migrated to Utica, as evidenced by the MVRCR’s notice that it offers 
employment and other resettlement services to secondary migration refugees.283 The overt 
support shown for refugees by the community at large has engendered in resettled refugees 
a strong sense of community and loyalty towards Utica. When asked to evaluate their views 
of Utica, in light of the current political climate, fully seventy-one percent of refugees in 
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Utica indicated, “it’s encouraged them to like Utica better … [as] [t]hey realize that they’re 
in a pretty good situation here.”284  
The outcomes are not completely positive. The influx of refugees has somewhat 
negatively impacted Utica’s school system. Refugee students require interpreters, incurring 
an average additional cost per refugee student of $2,500.285 Additionally, Utica schools 
attributed a lowering of standardized test scores overall to the fact that refugee students 
with poor English language skills comprise fifteen percent of the student population.286 
These concerns, however, have not dampened the city administration’s support for refugee 
resettlement, as it was noted that refugees provide far more of an economic benefit than 
cost to Utica.287  
Finally, recalling Jones and Teytelboym’s concerns regarding the importance of 
proportionality in identifying the number of refugees a community can responsibly host, 
even as Utica continues to welcome (and identifies itself as “The Town that Loves 
Refugees”), there are signs that Utica is reaching something of a tipping point.288 Overt 
anti-immigrant sentiment has increased, particularly towards more recent arrivals from 
Iraq.289 Further, the volume of refugees admitted in the past decade has been insufficient 
to counter the loss of other residents, leading to a continuing net decrease in population.290 
As the number of foreign-born residents increases amid an overall population decrease, 
Utica may be perceived less as an integrated community and more a community of 
immigrants that is replacing the native-born population. Such a result would risk 
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undermining the goal of successful refugee integration and potentially result in a backlash 
against refugees and other immigrants.291 This becomes particularly significant as the 
current administration considers giving states and local municipalities the ability to 
approve or veto any plan to resettle refugees.292 
5. Findings 
Refugee resettlement in Utica, New York, has largely been successful as a result of 
three factors: timing, opportunity, and community support. The first two factors, timing 
and opportunity, arose out of Utica’s industry exodus, which began in the 1960s, and 
resulted in a steady out-migration of youth and a large segment of the workforce.293 This 
decline in population resulted in much of the town’s residential areas suffering as well, as 
the inventory of apartments and homes outweighed demand and property values 
plummeted.294 By 1990, Utica was in desperate need of additional residents to reverse 
Utica’s decline and revitalize the town, which coincided perfectly with the first wave of 
Bosnian refugees.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, homes were being sold for as low as $2000 to 
Bosnian refugees who were quickly able to find work in local factories and businesses.295 
With ample affordable housing and ready employment available, Utica was the perfect 
environment for a group of refugees that mirrored the work ethics and values of the existing 
population, who also had strong family histories tied to economic migration from Europe. 
These refugees assimilated well into the fabric of Utica, and their success provided the 
platform upon which subsequent waves of refugee migrations—from Burma, Somalia and 
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Pakistan, among others—built their own success in Utica.296 The ability to find adequate 
employment and affordable housing with relative ease in Utica, New York, perhaps 
overestimates the worth of the MVRCR’s refugee resettlement programs. It could simply 
be that abundant employment and inexpensive housing allows the MVRCR to focus more 
resources on those other aspects of integration, such as English-language education and 
navigating the health care system.  
The third factor responsible for successful refugee resettlement and integration in 
Utica, New York, is the significant level of community support and involvement with the 
resettled refugees. This receptivity and interest may, in part, be attributed to Utica’s 
immigrant history. Utica experienced multiple waves of immigrants—German and Irish 
immigrants in the latter half of the 19th century and Italian and Polish immigrants in the 
early decades of the 20th century. Or it could just be a pragmatic desire to seek an expedient 
means to improve the city’s flagging fortunes.297 Regardless, Utica benefited from some 
luck—if an ethnic group’s misfortune can be considered lucky—as well as shrewd 
organizational planning, to capitalize on successive waves of refugee migration to the 
United States, beginning in the 1990s.  
The first wave of refugees resettled in Utica were Bosnians fleeing the civil war in 
the former Yugoslavia, and though Muslim, were generally similar in a perceived strong 
work ethic—and in appearance—to the largely white, working class majority population 
of Utica in the 1990s.298 This roughly similar social identity was significant, as “[t]o the 
extent that a host community sees accommodating to the presence of refugees as consistent 
with its group identity, there will be greater motivation to welcome refugees by assisting 
with their resettlement.”299 The availability of relatively well-paying employment options 
in trades similar to those performed in their native country, coupled with an almost 
immediate ability to find easily affordable quality housing to rent or purchase, became the 
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siren song that brought the refugees to Utica. The refugees themselves then organically 
created a community support network that was able to effectively assist newly arriving 
refugees, without the need for significant social service and community-at-large 
assistance.300  
In sum, operating a resettlement program in a receptive community environment in 
which two major needs, employment and housing, were readily obtainable and affordable, 
the MVRCR was able to focus services on other refugee concerns, such as language and 
health services. The heavy lift of sociocultural integration was, for the most part, embraced 
by the citizens, businesses and government of Utica as their responsibility, not the 
resettlement agency’s—and one that continues indefinitely. In such a positive, community-
wide environment, refugees are far more likely to feel welcome, protected, and cared for—
and thus will achieve a greater level of integration more quickly than other refugees in less-
conducive environments. 
C. DENMARK 
Though obviously not a participant in United States’ refugee resettlement process, 
I felt it important as part my analysis of potential resettlement program best practices to 
include in this thesis a review and discussion of Denmark’s refugee acceptance and 
integration process, paying particular attention to its use of pre-resettlement integration 
contracts.301 The contract includes the requirement that refugees remain in the resettlement 
location selected for them for three years, to promote Denmark’s “spatial dispersal” refugee 
integration strategy, which prevents refugees from clustering in select areas and forming 
isolated ethnic enclaves.302  
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1. Demographics 
The southernmost Scandinavian country in northern Europe, Denmark covers 
16,577 square miles, and is comprised of the Jutland Peninsula and over 400 small islands, 
of which only seventy-four are inhabited.303 In 2019, the population of Denmark was 5.8 
million, with the largest concentration, 1.2 million residents, in Denmark’s capital city of 
Copenhagen.304 Almost ninety percent of the population is of Nordic descent and have at 
least one parent born in Denmark and holding Danish citizenship.305 The other ten percent 
are immigrants or children of immigrants from Turkey, Southeast Asia, Eastern European 
countries, and the Middle East.306 Lutheranism is the official state religion and The 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Denmark the state church, though only 71.1 percent of the 
population identify as Christian, with a substantial number (25.7 percent) of residents 
identifying as Atheist or Agnostic, and an additional 2.6 percent practicing religions other 
than Christianity.307 Notably, based on a variety of assessed measures and indicators, in 
2019, Denmark ranked as the second “happiest” country in the World Happiness 
Report.308 
2. Refugees in Denmark 
Refugee migration to Denmark is a fairly recent phenomenon. Denmark introduced 
its first refugee introduction program in 1999, as part of the Danish Integration Act.309 
Since 1995, Denmark has issued residence permits to 105,000 refugees.310 Asylum 
applications—the mechanism by which refugees gain entry and residence in Denmark—
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reached a high of 21,000 in 2015, but fell to 2,600 in 2018 and in 2019 are holding at 
approximately fifty new applications per week.311 Demographically, since 2013, the 
majority of refugees seeking resettlement in Denmark have come predominantly from 
Syria (almost forty percent of all asylum applicants in 2015, down to fifteen percent by 
2019), Afghanistan, Eritrea, Morocco, Georgia, Somalia, Iran, and Iraq.312  
3. Resettlement Programs 
Denmark’s refugee resettlement program is managed by the government, though at 
the local levels, the government contracts with private and charitable organizations for the 
provision of some ancillary services.313 Administration of refugee admission and 
resettlement in Denmark falls under the Udlændingestyrelsen, the Danish Immigration 
Service, a directorate within the Danish Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration 
Affairs.314 Prospective refugees to Denmark undergo coordinated interviews and are 
assessed by the UNHCR, based on criteria for consideration provided by Denmark.315 
Refugees that meet the established criteria are referred to the Danish Immigration Service, 
but acceptance is not assured, as in addition to eligibility criteria, Denmark imposes an 
annual refugee admission cap.316 Further, in 2016, Denmark ceased accepting five-
hundred UNHCR “quota refugees” and has yet to resume acceptance under this specific 
program, asserting “it would not take in any refugees under the U.N.’s quota system in 
2018, focusing instead on integrating those recently arrived in the country.”317 
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In 2016, 2017, and 2018, Denmark reportedly spent approximately 6.4 billion 
Danish Krone (DKK) - about $944 million dollars—each year on integration efforts.318 
Those funds went to municipalities to assist with the costs of housing and feeding refugees, 
private companies and non-governmental private organizations that the state contracted 
with for service provision. Thus, as in the U.S., Denmark has begun to shift certain 
programmatic functions to private organizations.319 As of 2019, the Danish Immigration 
Service provides a basic cash allowance of 52.35 DKK ($7.72) per adult per day.320 
Supplementary cash assistance can be provided to refugees with minor children, from 
82.86 DKK ($12.22) per child per day, up to two children, to a maximum daily assistance 
amount of 252.98 DKK ($37.31). Additionally, refugees are eligible to receive annual 
clothing and hygiene packages, valued at 1488.61 DKK ($219.57) and 119.99 DKK 
($17.70).321  
The cornerstone of Denmark’s refugee introduction and resettlement program is 
engagement with refugees before acceptance, to ensure full understanding of the 
expectations and requirements the refugee will be held to in Denmark.322 This 
understanding is memorialized in a binding “Integration Contract” signed by the refugee 
and the host country’s immigration agency representative prior to acceptance for 
resettlement.323 As part of their contractual agreement, refugees understand they will have 
no say in the selection of the location of their resettlement.  
As part of the Danish Integration Act, Denmark implemented a mandatory spatial 
dispersal policy that legally binds refugees to live for three years in an assigned community, 
or risk forfeiting their state-provided and administered financial compensation package and 
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loss of resident status, resulting in possible removal from Denmark.324 Exceptions to the 
policy can be requested in certain circumstances, such as employment offers in other 
locations that would provide sufficient income to the refugee and obviate the need for the 
refugee stipend or other forms of financial assistance, or if the desired municipality agrees 
to assume financial responsibility for the requesting refugee.325 This formulaic refugee 
distribution policy has a two-fold purpose: First, it ensures that refugees do not concentrate 
in one single locus in Denmark (which could overload community services) and, second, 
it places refugees in communities in which they will be required to regularly interact with 
ethnically Nordic citizens, with the hope of leading to a more rapid and complete 
integration.326  
Refugees admitted to Denmark are given temporary resident status, which can be 
made permanent after three years and successful integration—defined as completion of all 
conditions outlined in a jointly-signed “Integration Contract.” Those conditions include 
demonstration of long-term employment, satisfactory completion of mandatory Danish 
language and cultural integration “Nordic values” courses, mastery of the Danish language, 
and good moral character, evidenced by a lack of negative contacts with law 
enforcement.327 Refugees admitted to Denmark through this process can petition for 
permanent resident status after five years and be “fast-tracked” for citizenship by the 
Danish Parliament, after eight years of residency.328  
Denmark’s governance model, similar to all other Scandinavian countries, is deeply 
rooted in social welfare.329 From monthly stipends, liberal maternity and paternity leave 
and subsistence payments, education at all levels, retirement, and free health services, 
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Denmark’s “Nordic model” does much to provide for the needs of their citizenry and 
residents, including admitted refugees.330 Over the initial three-year integration period, 
refugees receive full health, education, and housing benefits, though the refugee monthly 
stipend is approximately sixty percent of public social welfare benefits.331 The rationale 
behind providing refugees a smaller stipend than is given to other residents and citizens is 
to motivate refugees to seek work, rather than rely exclusively on social welfare 
payments.332  
With Denmark’s relatively small number of annual refugee admissions—only 844 
in 2018—it would seem the billions of krone budgeted each year for refugee integration 
are sufficient to cover the costs of providing for refugees.333 However, in 2016, Denmark’s 
parliament passed a controversial bill that permits police to seize valuables worth more 
than 10,000 DKK ($1,475), claiming it was a necessary action to help defray the costs of 
housing and feeding the 20,000 refugees that were seeking admission to Denmark in that 
year.334 It is unclear if or how often the government has exercised this right of seizure. 
4. Outcomes 
Employment rates of refugees still within the three-year period of Denmark’s 
formal integration process rose from twenty-one percent in the first half of 2015 to over 
thirty-six percent by the third quarter of 2017.335 Considering that the initial focus of 
Denmark’s refugee resettlement effort is not employment, but rather Danish language 
acquisition and participation in acculturation programs designed to facilitate refugee 
adoption of Nordic values, it is not surprising or of particular concern that employment 
                                                 
330 Razi Iqbal and Padma Todi, “The Nordic Model: Existence, Emergence and Sustainability,” 
Procedia Economics and Finance 30 (January 1, 2015): 336–51, https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-
5671(15)01301-5. 
331 Larsen, “Becoming Part of Welfare Scandinavia.” 
332 Larsen. 
333 European Commission, “Governance of Migrant Integration in Denmark.” 
334 “Denmark Approves Controversial Migrant Assets Bill,” BBC, January 26, 2016, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35406436. 
335 European Commission, “Governance of Migrant Integration in Denmark.” 
74 
rates for refugees are roughly half that of refugees resettled in the United States. After three 
years in the country, Denmark’s refugee employment rate increased to forty-five percent, 
overall.336 Municipalities in which refugee women were placed, however, reported some 
difficulty in getting refugee women to pursue employment opportunities.337 
Measuring integration success by a lack of secondary migration would be of little 
value, as the Danish Integration Act requires refugees to remain in their designated location 
for three years. However, the Danish government maintains a national “Integration 
Barometer” that tracks refugee participation in nine different parameters that are partial 
indicators of integration—work, education, Danish language knowledge, civic inclusion, 
discrimination, public assistance, crime, “ghetto” area creation and exposure (essentially, 
tracking the number and rise of urban refugee neighborhoods that had become insular 
“ghettos,” as well as identifying neighborhoods at risk of becoming refugee “ghettos”), and 
self-determination—and further national objectives for refugee integration.338 As would 
be expected, mandatory programs enjoy a high success rate in their respective parameter. 
Danish language fluency is high among refugees (fifty-six percent) after three years, and 
only twenty-eight percent of refugees were still on some form of public assistance, three 
years after resettlement.339 Moreover, a large percentage of refugees (sixty-seven percent) 
are politically active, in some manner—primarily voting.340 Refugees who have lived in 
Denmark over three years, though still temporary residents, are able to vote, but this 
measure also includes local association membership and persons recognized for their 
community efforts, for which there is no minimum residency requirement.341 
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Refugee resettlement in Denmark is guided by a simple premise: The needs of 
Denmark come first. This tenet guides Denmark’s process for selecting and resettling a 
very small number of eligible refugees, and that philosophy informs every aspect of their 
resettlement—from mandating three-year placement in locations determined by the 
government, to requiring refugees, to the greatest extent possible, to adopt Nordic values 
and gain fluency in the Danish language as a necessary prerequisite to transitioning from a 
temporary to permanent resident and, ultimately, citizen of Denmark.342 Refugee 
integration in Denmark is less a matter of accepting cultural differences, and more a 
deliberate strategy to fit and mold refugees into Danish culture. This concern—even fear—
of the impact of immigration on Danish culture can be seen in increasingly overt anti-
immigrant sentiment in Denmark, in the government and among the populace.343 
Controlling where refugees live after their resettlement for a fixed length of time is 
key to Denmark’s refugee integration goals (at least integration as envisioned by 
Denmark). Resettling refugees strategically and intentionally in a way that places refugees 
in communities in which there are few residents of similar background and history is more 
disruptive and daunting, certainly, than resettling refugees in communities with large, 
established same origin refugee communities, but it forces refugees to engage directly with 
native Danes. Without the agreement to remain in that location for three years, many 
refugees would quickly gravitate to more culturally familiar environs, creating clusters and 
enclaves that work against Denmark’s integration expectations.344 Taking away a 
refugee’s ability to freely move within a country seems draconian and even unfair as a 
condition precedent to acceptance for resettlement, but for Denmark, it has proven to be a 
valuable component to the integration program’s success. 
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V. ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A. ANALYSIS 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I noted there are three variables in the refugee 
integration equation: the refugee, the community, and the resettlement program. Each of 
the three programs studied demonstrated to varying degrees the importance of one or more 
of those entities in refugee integration. In Salt Lake City, Utah, the resettlement program 
was highlighted. The IRC looked beyond simplistic structural integration measures and 
developed a multi-faceted and extended integration program that regularly reached out to 
the refugee in assessing the program’s quality. That shifts the focus from structural 
integration to sociocultural integration and the intentional measuring of success through 
the refugee’s assessments over other traditional metrics of employment, education, and 
secondary migration.  
Though Utica, New York, also showed successful integration of refugees, the 
resettlement program itself was largely unremarkable, in terms of innovation and duration. 
Utica’s successes with its immigrant and refugee population are the result of acute 
awareness by the community that refugees were and continue to be key to the survival of 
the town. Moreover, the community is refugees. One out of every six residents in Utica is 
a refugee.345 The visibility and voice of refugees in Utica is evident everywhere. It is 
understandable that refugees would feel a stronger sense of belonging and overt support in 
such an environment.  
For Denmark, the resettlement program is far longer and focuses most heavily, at 
least immediately after initial resettlement, on ensuring refugees acquire Danish language 
skills or at least awareness of traditional Nordic cultural values. Though Denmark’s 
resettlement program is certainly robust, simply put, it focuses on molding refugees into 
Danes, not on celebrating and incorporating into the local community a refugee’s native 
cultural heritage. For that reason, the acculturation program required by law and 
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incorporated into Denmark’s resettlement program is not appropriate for consideration in 
the United States.  
The one component of Denmark’s refugee resettlement program that merits 
consideration in the U.S. is the mandatory three-year resettlement requirement in a location 
of the government’s choosing, in furtherance of Denmark’s spatial dispersal policy. As of 
2019, fifteen years after initial placement in locales throughout Denmark, seventy-five 
percent of refugees are still in their location of original placement.346 This lack of 
secondary migration by refugees in Denmark once their movement is no longer restricted 
suggests that strong social bonds and community ties are created over the course of that 
time period. This is something that would benefit the United States and the free case 
refugees resettled here.  
The review of Utica’s refugee integration efforts illustrates the value of a supportive 
and engaged community. Refugees feel safer and more welcomed in Utica, than in other 
locations.347 Utica’s reputation as a welcoming community for refugees and, unlike many 
urban centers in which refugees were initially resettled, with low crime, ample employment 
opportunities and good, affordable housing, resulted in a secondary migration flow, which, 
though officially discouraged, is also an indicator of successful integration strategies.348 
Likewise, Salt Lake City provided strong community support for refugees, as evidenced 
by private donations for that city’s ECM pilot program, and the Governor Gary Herbert’s 
2016 open pledge to “keep the door open” for refugees.349 In Denmark, community 
support is essentially assured, as part of the calculus that drives refugee resettlement 
location determinations is the community’s ability to provide the necessary support 
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services, further assured through Danish Social Services funding for that purpose.350 
Private and charitable organizations also provide support to refugees in Denmark, but 
unlike the United States’ program, they are not as influential and not involved in the 
resettlement location determination.351 
The analysis of the third reviewed program, Denmark’s, focuses primarily on the 
refugee’s role in the integration equation. This may seem strange, considering prospective 
refugees must essentially sign away their ability to live in any location in Denmark other 
than that chosen for them by the government, and they must agree to remain in that location 
chosen for them for three years, if they hope to secure permanent residency and citizenship. 
But it is precisely for those reasons that the refugee becomes the key factor in successful 
resettlement and integration. Selection for resettlement in Denmark is very hard, and 
refugees offered the opportunity understand the value of securing a foothold in Denmark. 
Nevertheless, the necessity of living in a community wholly different from their known 
world is a daunting prospect. Refugees who accept that challenge have to be strong, not 
weak. For all of its mandated acculturation and Danish language requirement, the program 
can succeed only if refugees set their minds to succeeding in those endeavors.  
This understanding informed the ECM program in Salt Lake City. The regular 
engagement and quarterly interviews at which the participating refugees assessed their own 
wellbeing and efforts, in addition to the quality of care received by the program, 
communicated to the refugees their value as not just participants, but in many ways masters 
of their own destinies, regardless of the circumstances that brought them to the United 
States. In Utica, New York, the entrepreneurial nature of refugees, evidenced through the 
establishment of many local business and revitalization of older neighborhoods, provides 
newly-arrived refugees tangible evidence of truly successful refugee integration.352 The 
analysis of refugee engagement in these three programs makes one thing quite clear: though 
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there are three entities that must work together for integration to result, it is ultimately the 
refugee that makes the difference. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
I recommend two component practices identified in the review of domestic and 
international refugee resettlement programs for inclusion in current and future resettlement 
practices in the United States.  
1. Implement a Three-Year Contractual Relocation Bar for Free Case 
Refugees 
Third-party selection of resettlement location is already in use in the United States 
for free case refugees. Implementing a contractual component in which free case refugees 
agree to remain in their designated resettlement location for a defined length of time would 
benefit both the free case refugee and the nation, as such an agreement would eliminate the 
problems associated with refugee secondary migration. Secondary migration is often 
detrimental to the refugee. Refugees stand to lose the assistance earmarked for them in 
their original resettlement location, and they risk falling through the cracks once away from 
their original support network. Secondary migration is also problematic for the 
communities and agencies impacted. Unanticipated refugee migration to a second location 
puts an additional, sometimes untenable, strain on community services and resources in the 
new community.  
Further, secondary migration disrupts and delays the goal of integration. Leaving 
an original resettlement location, with or without continued resettlement support and cash 
assistance, represents the abandonment of whatever progress the refugee has already made 
towards integration. Adopting this element of the Danish resettlement model would 
promote greater stability in the refugee community, which would, in turn, facilitate 
comprehensive integration. By adding such an element to free case refugee resettlement—
beginning with full disclosure to the free case refugee of a requirement to remain in the 
location selected for them for a period of three years as a specific condition of acceptance 
for resettlement—the United States takes an important step in addressing an issue in 
refugee resettlement that frustrates the nation’s refugee integration goals. Moreover, 
81 
implementing this procedure would significantly reduce the risk refugees face when 
secondary destinations fail to live up to the promises that lured the refugee to them in the 
first place.353  
I am mindful of the reality that enforcement of this condition would be, to say the 
least, extremely difficult. When free case refugees are presented with the choice of 
accepting a mandatory term of stay in a place or not being offered resettlement at all, their 
choice is clear – free case refugees will overwhelmingly agree to those conditions. Whether 
or not they truly understand this requirement (or understand but have no intention of 
honoring the agreement), how will we respond to failures to adhere to the agreement? Do 
we refuse further assistance and services to those refugees? Do we repatriate them to their 
native country or location of last refuge prior to resettlement? Both responses seem severe 
and in conflict with our American values. Perhaps the answer is not the stick, but the carrot. 
Create sufficient incentives for free case refugees to remain in their original resettlement 
location, such that secondary migration becomes an unattractive last option. If that is one 
way we can encourage refugees to stay, we should look more closely at the Danish 
resettlement model and the services that country provides its citizens and refugees.354  
Certainly, placing movement restrictions on refugees, even if the restriction was 
understood and agreed to prior to resettlement, would be viewed by many as in direct 
conflict with the freedom of movement and association enjoyed by all persons in the United 
States. That may be to some degree true. It is, however, also true that many resettlement 
programs already require refugees to sign resettlement agreements that, if not mandate, 
strongly encourage refugees to remain in that location for at least ninety days and ensures 
the agency and refugee receive the benefit of Reception and Placement funds provided by 
the Office of Refugee Resettlement.355 Adoption of this recommendation would increase 
the terms of existing agreements to a timeframe that would better ensure comprehensive 
integration. Adding this additional requirement in free case refugee resettlement would add 
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virtually no additional cost, just the addition of a page to the documents refugees already 
are required to sign prior to resettlement. It should also be noted that on September 26, 
2019, President Trump signed an Executive Order that requires the written consent of state 
and local governments before any refugee will be resettled in that designated locale.356 
These efforts incrementally work to reduce a refugee’s ability to move within the United 
States and continue to receive resettlement assistance. Implementing a contractually-
agreed upon duration of stay requirement is no different, just more obvious. 
2. Extend Resettlement Assistance and Services to Twenty-Four Months 
As noted in previous chapters, most current refugee resettlement assistance 
programs provide services and assistance for a period of no longer than nine months. This 
is wholly inadequate to ensure refugees achieve more than just minimal structural 
integration. In order to facilitate the goal of comprehensive integration—a goal that 
promotes the safety, security, and prosperity of the nation—local resettlement organization 
programs should increase the duration resettlement services to refugees from current 
standards. The Extended Case Management program developed in 2009 by the IRC in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, achieved consistently high levels of success—measured by decreased 
secondary migration rates and refugee self-assessments of “good” or “very good” 
wellbeing and satisfaction with the resettlement process.357 The benefits of ECM were 
most pronounced in the second year of the program. Steady improvement in virtually all 
measures was seen in the first year, but the second year saw the greatest increases in refugee 
overall wellbeing and adjustment to the community.358  
In addition to extending resettlement programs for twenty-four months, the 
monthly cash assistance currently provided to refugees for their first eight months of 
resettlement and healthcare program eligibility should also be extended to twenty-four 
months. The costs associated with the monthly cash assistance would triple, of course, but 
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it should be noted that at the time of implementation of the Act, cash assistance was 
available for up to thirty-six months.359 That timeframe was reduced shortly after 
implementation of the Act to eighteen months and further reduced in 1991 to eight 
months.360 Even in 1980, with the focus of the Act firmly establishing the requirement that 
resettled refugees achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible, it seems it was 
understood that limited cash assistance would be necessary and appropriate for a period 
longer than a mere eight months.  
Now is an opportune time to mandate the extension of resettlement programs and 
assistance to twenty-four months. Decreasing refugee admission caps and annual 
admissions has resulted in many programs no longer having sufficient work to perform, 
resulting in the shuttering of many local resettlement organizations and the downsizing of 
many others.361 Should the administration change or the political winds shift and refugee 
admissions ramp up again, it would be difficult for agencies that lost experienced staff or 
closed entirely to quickly establish satisfactory operations.362  
By extending the duration of current programs, organizations can retain skilled 
staff. This addresses more than an economic incentive; it also provides a homeland security 
incentive. Refugees who are satisfied with their resettlement experience are less likely to 
engage in secondary migration. Refugees who leave their original resettlement location 
risk the loss of resettlement services and social networks that facilitate integration. 
Refugees who do not seek integration in their local communities become isolated from the 
American experience. Considering the effort and expense incurred in bringing these 
refugees to the United States, it is important that we pursue effective integration strategies 
for them. 
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This study reviewed a small sampling of refugee resettlement programs in the 
United States and abroad to determine ways in which refugee resettlement in the United 
States could improve the integration of free case refugees into the fabric of American 
society. Integration is more than just economic self-sufficiency or the ability to navigate in 
a new space. Integration—true, comprehensive integration—is achieved when a refugee 
develops ties of loyalty and a sense of responsibility and ownership towards their 
community, and the community, in turn, feels that the refugee is an integral part of the 
community. To that end, this study identified two actions that should be considered for 
implementation in the United States’ refugee resettlement program: extend the provision 
of resettlement services and assistance to all refugees for twenty-four months, and, for free 
case refugees, implement a contractual agreement that requires the refugee to remain in the 
location designated for resettlement for a period of three years.  
This study was necessarily limited by two factors: the lack of an accepted definition 
of integration and the lack of uniform data collection for all refugee resettlement 
organizations. How can one claim success in integration when there isn’t even an industry-
accepted definition of integration? Without a uniform definition of integration, 
determinations of the success or failure of integration are, in the end, inherently subjective. 
That subjectivity permeates the data collected by resettlement organizations. One 
organization may assess its efforts as successful if over half of the refugees served obtained 
employment. Another organization might look beyond similar statistics and assess 
themselves unsuccessful if the employed refugees were in positions not at levels 
commensurate with their education. Refugee employment percentages are the most 
common measure, simply because it is something that can be measured. Measuring a 
refugee’s levels of happiness and satisfaction, however, are far more difficult. 
Unfortunately, the difficulties inherent in crafting accurate and uniform measures of a 
refugee’s emotional state ensures that such efforts are abandoned in favor of simpler 
metrics, such as the achievement of economic self-sufficiency.  
Unfortunately, limiting an analysis of refugee integration to simple measures of 
employment and economic self-sufficiency ignores the most critical component of 
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integration: the development of a sense of responsibility towards the future of the 
community and the state. Developing that sense of responsibility must be the goal and 
measure of success of any resettlement program. Consequently, to ensure the U.S. refugee 
resettlement program incorporates that goal into future efforts at the local, state, and federal 
level, a uniform definition of integration must be formulated and agreed upon. Once that 
task is accomplished, standardized measurements of a refugee’s progress towards that 
accepted definition of integration must be developed, so that every resettlement 
organization can work with greater clarity of purpose and goal, and results of those efforts 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
87 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ackerman, L.K. “Health Problems of Refugees.” Journal of the American Board of 
Family Practitioners 10 (1997): 337–48. 
Administration for Children and Families. “The History of the Matching Grant Program.” 
October 27, 2015. https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/the-history-of-the-
matching-grant-program. 
———. “Voluntary Agencies.” July 17, 2012. https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/
voluntary-agencies. 
Ainsley, Julia. “Trump Admin Weighs Letting States, Cities Deny Entry to Refugees.” 
NBC, August 21, 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-
admin-weighs-letting-states-cities-deny-entry-refugees-approved-n1044801. 
Amos, Deborah. “2018 Was A Year Of Drastic Cuts to U.S. Refugee Admissions.” NPR, 
December 27, 2018. https://www.npr.org/2018/12/27/680308538/2018-was-a-
year-of-drastic-cuts-to-u-s-refugee-admissions. 
Bacheller, John. “The Decline of Manufacturing in New York and the Rust Belt.” Policy 
by Numbers New York. Updated October 26, 2017. https://policybynumbers.com/
the-decline-of-manufacturing-in-new-york-and-the-rust-belt. 
Barnett, Don. “Do States Have a Say in the Refugee Resettlement Program?” Center for 
Immigration Studies, January 24, 2018. https://cis.org/Report/Do-States-Have-
Say-Refugee-Resettlement-Program. 
Barrett, Michael. “Here’s How Foreigners Can Vote in Denmark’s Municipal and 
Regional Elections.” The Local, November 6, 2017. https://www.thelocal.dk/
20171106/heres-how-foreigners-can-vote-in-denmarks-municipal-and-regional-
elections. 
BBC. “Denmark Approves Controversial Migrant Assets Bill.” January 26, 2016. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35406436. 
Bendixen, Michala Clante. “The Asylum Procedure in Denmark.” Refugees.dk, accessed 
June 2, 2019. http://refugees.dk/en/facts/the-asylum-procedure-in-denmark/. 
———. “How Many Refugees Are Coming to Denmark.” Refugees.dk, accessed 
November 26, 2019. http://refugees.dk/en/facts/numbers-and-statistics/how-
many-are-coming-and-from-where/. 




Bergson-Shilcock, Amanda. “New Federal Immigrant Integration Bill Includes NSC—
Recommended Workforce and Education Components.” National Skills 
Coalition, November 5, 2019. https://www.nationalskillscoalition.org/news/blog/
new-federal-immigrant-integration-bill-includes-nsc-recommended-workforce-
and-education-components. 
Bernstein, Hamutal. Bringing Evidence to the Refugee Integration Debate. Washington, 
DC: The Urban Institute, April 2018. 
Best Places. “Utica, New York Religion.” Accessed November 25, 2019. 
https://www.bestplaces.net/religion/city/new_york/utica. 
Blais, Peter. “The Shock of the New.” Planning 69, no. 2 (February 2003): 14–17. 
Bloem, Jeffrey, and Scott Loveridge. “The Costs of Secondary Migration: Perspectives 
from Local Voluntary Agencies in the USA.” Journal of International Migration 
and Integration 19, no. 2 (May 1, 2018): 233–51. 
———. “The Secondary Migration of Refugees Resettled in the US.” Forced Migration 
Review, no. 54 (February 2017): 26–28. 
Bose, Pablo S. “Welcome and Hope, Fear, and Loathing: The Politics of Refugee 
Resettlement in Vermont.” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 24, 
no. 3 (August 2018): 320–29. http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1037/
pac0000302. 
Bottari, Steve. “What Portland Can Learn from Lewiston’s Immigrant Surge 20 Years 
Ago.” WMTW, July 24, 2019. https://www.wmtw.com/article/what-portland-can-
learn-from-lewiston-s-immigrant-surge-20-years-ago/28493582. 
Boyd, Monica. “Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent 
Developments and New Agendas.” The International Migration Review 23, no. 3 
(1989): 638–70. https://doi.org/10.2307/2546433. 
Brown, Anastasia, and Todd Scribner. “Unfulfilled Promises, Future Possibilities: The 
Refugee Resettlement System in the United States.” Journal on Migration and 
Human Security 2, no. 2 (2014): 101–120. 
Bruno, Andorra. Reception and Placement of Refugees in the United States. CRS Report 
No. R44878. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 21, 2017. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Bureau of Labor Statistics Data.” Accessed November 24, 
2019. https://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet. 
89 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. “Fiscal Year 2016 Refugee Admissions.” 
Fact sheet, U.S. Department of State, January 20, 2017. https://www.state.gov/
remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-population-refugees-and-migration/fiscal-year-
2016-refugee-admissions/. 
———. “FY 2019 Notice of Funding Opportunity for Reception and Placement 
Program.” U.S. Department of State, March 15, 2018. https://www.state.gov/
funding-opportunities/funding-opportunity-announcements/fy-2019-notice-of-
funding-opportunity-for-reception-and-placement-program/. 
———. “Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2019.” U.S. Department of State, 
September 24, 2018. https://www.state.gov/remarks-and-releases-bureau-of-
population-refugees-and-migration/proposed-refugee-admissions-for-fiscal-year-
2019/. 
———. “Reception and Placement.” U.S. Department of State, accessed August 1, 2019. 
https://www.state.gov/refugee-admissions/reception-and-placement/. 
Catholic Charities USA. “New Report Demonstrates Positive Impact of Refugees in 
United States.” June 29, 2018. https://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/press_release/
new-report-demonstrates-positive-impact-of-refugees-in-united-states/. 
Catholic Community Services of Utah. “About Catholic Community Services of Utah.” 
Accessed November 24, 2019. https://www.ccsutah.org/about-us/mission-history. 
CDC. “Domestic Refugee Health: Frequently Asked Questions.” Last reviewed June 8, 
2016. https://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealth/guidelines/domestic-refugee-
questions.html. 
———. “Hepatitis B Screening and Prevalence among Resettled Refugees—United 
States, 2006–2011.” June 5, 2015. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm6421a2.htm. 
The Center Utica. “History of the Center.” Accessed November 25, 2019. 
https://www.thecenterutica.org/about/our-history/. 
———. “Refugee Resettlement Services for Utica Refugees.” Accessed October 14, 
2019. https://www.thecenterutica.org/our-services/refugee-resettlement/. 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. “Church Donates $2 Million in Ongoing 
Refugee Aid.” August 31, 2016. http://newsroom.churchofjesuschrist.org/article/
church-donates-2-million-in-ongoing-refugee-aid?__prclt=mtl1R1MP. 
Clifford, Miriam. “With Welcoming Stance, Conservative Utah Charts its Own Course 




Copenhagen Capacity. “A Welfare Society.” Accessed November 26, 2019. 
https://www.copcap.com/living-and-working/a-welfare-society. 
Council on Accreditation. “Standard.” Accessed November 18, 2019. https://coanet.org/
standard/rrs/. 
Cunningham, Matt. “Salt Lake County Is Now Minority Mormon, and the Impacts Are 
Far Reaching.” Salt Lake Tribune, December 9, 2018. https://www.sltrib.com/
religion/2018/12/09/salt-lake-county-is-now/. 
Darrow, Jessica. “The (Re)Construction of the U.S. Department of State’s Reception and 
Placement Program by Refugee Resettlement Agencies.” Journal of the Society 
for Social Work and Research 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2015): 91–119. https://doi.org/
10.1086/680341. 
Data USA. “Utica, NY.” Accessed October 13, 2019. https://datausa.io/profile/geo/utica-
ny/. 
Eberspacher, Sarah. “What You Bring When You Run for Your Life.” The Week, 
January 19, 2015. https://theweek.com/captured/533520/what-bring-when-run-
life. 
Eckert, Fabian, Mads Hejlesen, and Conor Walsh. “The Return to Big City Experience: 
Evidence from Danish Refugees.” Working paper, Opportunity and Inclusive 
Growth Institute, Federal rEserve Bank of Minneapolis, September, 2019. 
https://doi.org/10.21034/iwp.24. 
Encyclopedia Britannica. “Utah: Capital, Map, Facts, & Points of Interest.” Accessed 
November 24, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/place/Utah. 
European Commission. “Governance of Migrant Integration in Denmark.” Accessed 
November 26, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/governance/
denmark. 
European Resettlement Network. “Denmark.” Accessed November 26, 2019. 
https://www.resettlement.eu/country/denmark. 
Evans, William N., and Daniel Fitzgerald. “The Economic and Social Outcomes of 
Refugees in the United States: Evidence from the ACS.” Working paper, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, June 2017. https://doi.org/10.3386/w23498. 
Executive Office of the President. “Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions 
for Fiscal Year 2019.” Presidential Determination No. 2019-01 of October 4, 




Ferwerda, Jeremy, D.J. Flynn, and Yusaku Horiuchi. “Explaining Opposition to Refugee 
Resettlement: The Role of NIMBYism and Perceived Threats.” Science Advances 
3, no. 9 (September 6, 2017). https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1700812. 
Forrest, Tamar Mott, and Lawrence A. Brown. “Organization-Led Migration, Individual 
Choice, and Refugee Resettlement in the U.S.: Seeking Regularities.” 
Geographical Review 104, no. 1 (January 2014): 10–32. 
Fulton, William. “Refugee Renewal.” Governing, May 2005. 
https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/Refugee-Renewal.html. 
Government Accountability Office. Iraqi Refugees and Special Immigrant Visa Holders 
Face Challenges Resettling in the United States and Obtaining U.S. Government 
Employment. GAO-10-274. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
March 2010. 
———. Refugee Resettlement, Greater Consultation with Community Stakeholders 
Could Strengthen Program. GAO-12-729. Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2012. https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592975.pdf. 
Guilherme Fernandes, Ariana. “(Dis)Empowering New Immigrants and Refugees 
through Their Participation in Introduction Programs in Sweden, Denmark, and 
Norway.” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 13, no. 3 (2015): 245–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2015.1045054. 
Hagaman, Ashley K., Teresa I. Sivilli, Trong Ao, Curtis Blanton, Heidi Ellis, Barbara 
Lopes Cardozo, and Sharmila Shetty. “An Investigation into Suicides among 
Bhutanese Refugees Resettled in the United States Between 2008 and 2011.” 
Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health 18, no. 4 (August 2016): 819–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10903-015-0326-6. 
Hagstrom, Paul, Javier Pereira, and Stephen Wu. “The Happiness of Refugees in the 
United States: Evidence from Utica, NY.” Journal of Refugee Studies (January 
2019). 
HIAS. “History.” Accessed August 1, 2019. https://www.hias.org/history. 
Hofverberg, Elin. “Refugee Law and Policy: Denmark.” Library of Congress, March 
2016. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/denmark.php. 
Huisman, Kimberly A. “Why Maine? Secondary Migration Decisions of Somali 
Refugees.” Ìrìnkèrindò: A Journal of African Migration, no. 5 (December 2011). 
https://africamigration.com/archives/issue5-dec2011. 
Hynie, Michaela. “Refugee Integration: Research and Policy.” Peace and Conflict: 
Journal of Peace Psychology 24, no. 3 (August 2018): 265–76. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/pac0000326. 
92 
Immigration to the United States. “Ethnic Enclaves.” Accessed November 4, 2019. 
https://immigrationtounitedstates.org/484-ethnic-enclaves.html. 
International Organization for Migration. “United States of America.” February 4, 2015. 
https://www.iom.int/countries/united-states-america. 
International Rescue Committee. “Rescue Lives in Salt Lake City, UT.” Accessed 
November 24, 2019. https://www.rescue.org/united-states/salt-lake-city-ut. 
Iqbal, Razi, and Padma Todi. “The Nordic Model: Existence, Emergence and 
Sustainability.” Procedia Economics and Finance 30 (January 1, 2015): 336–51. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(15)01301-5. 
Jones, Will, and Alexander Teytelboym. “The Local Refugee Match: Aligning Refugees’ 
Preferences with the Capacities and Priorities of Localities.” Journal of Refugee 
Studies 31, no. 2 (August 16, 2017): 152–78. 
Jordan, Miriam. “With Welcoming Stance, Conservative Utah Charts its Own Course on 
Refugees.” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2016. https://www.wsj.com/articles/
with-welcoming-stance-conservative-utah-charts-its-own-course-on-refugees-
1459125392. 
Karas, Tania. “US Refugee Agencies Wither as Trump Administration Cuts Numbers to 
Historic Lows.” Public Radio International, September 27, 2019. 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-09-27/us-refugee-agencies-wither-trump-
administration-cuts-numbers-historic-lows. 
Kennedy, Edward M. “Refugee Act of 1980.” The International Migration Review 15, 
no. 1/2 (1981): 141–56. https://doi.org/10.2307/2545333. 
Kenny, Paul, and Kate Lockwood-Kenny. “A Mixed Blessing: Karen Resettlement to the 
United States.” Journal of Refugee Studies 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 217–38. 
Kerwin, Donald. “The US Refugee Resettlement Program—A Return to First Principles: 
How Refugees Help to Define, Strengthen, and Revitalize the United States,” 
Journal on Migration and Human Security 6, no. 3 (2018): 205–25, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2331502418787787. 
Larsen, BirgitteRomme. “Becoming Part of Welfare Scandinavia: Integration through the 
Spatial Dispersal of Newly Arrived Refugees in Denmark.” Journal of Ethnic & 
Migration Studies 37, no. 2 (February 2011): 333–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/
1369183X.2011.521337. 




Lunn, Laura P. “Displaced and Disillusioned: ‘Free-Case’ Refugees and the 
Government’s Obligation to Facilitate Effective Resettlement.” The Journal of 
Gender, Race, and Justice; Iowa City 14, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 833–65. 
Manta. “Mohawk Valley Resource Center.” Accessed November 26, 2019. 
https://www.manta.com/c/mmlz5zp/mohawk-valley-resource-center. 
Mares, Courtney. “The Catholic Church’s Long History of Resettling Refugees in the 
US.” Catholic News Agency, June 21, 2018. 
https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/the-catholic-churchs-long-history-of-
resettling-refugees-in-the-us-67504. 
Mathema, Silva. “What Works.” Center for American Progress, February 28, 2018. 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/02/28/
447283/what-works/. 
Meissner, Doris M. “The Refugee Act of 1980: What Have We Learned ?” Revue 
Européenne Des Migrations Internationales 6, no. 1 (1990): 129–40. 
https://doi.org/10.3406/remi.1990.1231. 
Migration Policy Institute. “U.S. Annual Refugee Resettlement Ceilings and Number of 
Refugees Admitted, 1980–Present.” Accessed December 4, 2019. 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/us-annual-refugee-
resettlement-ceilings-and-number-refugees-admitted-united. 
Misra, Tanvi. “What Happens to Cities That Welcome Refugees.” CityLab, January 31, 
2019. https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/01/refugee-admissions-resettlement-
trump-immigration/580318/. 
Mitschke, Diane B, Regina T Praetorius, Don R Kelly, Eusebius Small, and Youn K Kim. 
“Listening to Refugees: How Traditional Mental Health Interventions May Miss 
the Mark.” International Social Work 60, no. 3 (May 1, 2017): 588–600. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0020872816648256. 
Mousa, Salma. “Boosting Refugee Outcomes: Evidence from Policy, Academia, and 
Social Innovation.” Scholarly paper, Social Science Research Network, October 
2, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3259255. 
Murray, Kate E., Graham R. Davidson, and Robert D. Schweitzer. “Review of Refugee 
Mental Health Interventions Following Resettlement: Best Practices and 
Recommendations.” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 80, no. 4 (2010): 576–
85. http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1111/j.1939-0025.2010.01062.x, 582. 
Myrberg, Gunnar. “Local Challenges and National Concerns: Municipal Level Responses 
to National Refugee Settlement Policies in Denmark and Sweden.” International 
Review of Administrative Sciences 83, no. 2 (June 1, 2017): 322–39. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852315586309. 
94 
New American Economy. “From Struggle to Resilience: The Economic Impact of 
Refugees in America.” Report, Immigration Research Library, June 2017. 
https://www.immigrationresearch.org/report/other/struggle-resilience-economic-
impact-refugees-america-0. 
New to Denmark. “Conditions for Asylum Seekers.” Accessed November 26, 2019. 
http://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-GB/Waiting/Asylum/Conditions for asylum 
seekers. 
New York Times. “Revercomb Urges Quota Retention.” December 31, 1946. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1946/12/31/archives/revercomb-urges-quota-retention-
warns-of-communist-peril-in.html?searchResultPosition=1. 
Ngai, Mae M. “The Architecture of Race in American Immigration Law: A 
Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924.” The Journal of American 
History 86, no. 1 (June 1, 1999): 67. 
NPR. “The U.S. Has Accepted Only 11 Syrian Refugees This Year.” April 12, 2018. 
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/04/12/602022877/the-u-s-has-
welcomed-only-11-syrian-refugees-this-year. 
———. “Utica, N.Y., Which Welcomes Refugees, Monitors Trump’s Muslim 
Comments.” November 22, 2016. https://www.npr.org/2016/11/22/502980034/
utica-n-y-which-welcomes-refugees-monitors-trumps-muslim-comments. 
NYS Health Foundation. “Opening Doors: A Sustainable Refugee Health Care Model.” 
Report, NYS Health Foundation, January 2016. 
Observer-Dispatch. “Refugee Students Add Much to Learning Environment, but Cost to 
Educate Them More Expensive.” March 9, 2014. https://www.uticaod.com/
article/20140309/NEWS/140309402. 
Oduntan, Olubukola, and Ian Ruthven. “Investigating the Information Gaps in Refugee 
Integration: Investigating the Information Gaps in Refugee Integration.” 
Proceedings of the Association for Information Science and Technology 54, no. 1 
(2017): 308–17. https://doi.org/10.1002/pra2.2017.14505401034. 
Office of Refugee Resettlement. “About Refugee Social Services.” Last reviewed 
November 6, 2018. https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/refugee-social-
services/about. 
———. “Annual Report to Congress: Office of Refugee Resettlement Fiscal Year 2016.” 




———. “Guidance on Refugee Social Services Funding.” Office of Refugee 
Resettlement, June 24, 2016. https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/guidance-on-
refugee-social-services-funding. 
———. “Refugee Medical Assistance.” Last reviewed May 3, 2019. 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/cma/about. 
———. “Refugees.” Last reviewed October 22, 2018. https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/
refugees. 
———. “Refugee Social Services.” Accessed April 2, 2019. https://www.acf.hhs.gov/
orr/programs/refugee-social-services. 
———. “The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program—An Overview.” September 14, 2015. 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/the-us-refugee-resettlement-program-an-
overview. 
Oneida County New York. “Oneida County Announces Funding to Improve Healthcare 
for At-Risk Population.” July 2, 2018. https://www.ocgov.net/content/oneida-
county-announces-funding-improve-healthcare-risk-population. 
Oneida Daily Dispatch. “Mohawk Valley Resource Center for Refugees Launches New 
Welcome Center.” September 21, 2019. https://www.oneidadispatch.com/news/
local-news/mohawk-valley-resource-center-for-refugees-launches-new-welcome-
center/article_8f5f5bb6-dc00-11e9-a429-6f51c13d6a2c.html. 
Ott, Eleanor. “Get Up and Go: Refugee Resettlement and Secondary Migration in the 
USA.” Research paper no. 219. Research paper, UNHCR, September 2019. 
Paine, Thomas. “Common Sense.” Project Gutenberg, last updated June 24, 2017. 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/147/147-h/147-h.htm. 
Palinkas, Lawrence A., Sheila M. Pickwell, Kendra Brandstein, Terry J. Clark, Linda L. 
Hill, Robert J. Moser, and Abdikadir Osman. “The Journey to Wellness: Stages of 
Refugee Health Promotion and Disease Prevention.” Journal of Immigrant Health 
5, no. 1 (January 2003): 19–28. 
PBS. “What Happened When This Struggling City Opened its Arms to Refugees.” July 6, 
2017. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/happened-struggling-city-opened-
arms-refugees. 
Penninx, Rinus. “Integration: The Role of Communities, Institutions, and the State.” 
Migration Policy Institute, October 1, 2003. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/integration-role-communities-institutions-and-state. 
96 
Pew Research Center. “America Admits Fewer Refugees as Number Displaced Grows 
Globally.” October 12, 2017. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/10/12/u-
s-resettles-fewer-refugees-even-as-global-number-of-displaced-people-grows/. 
Polcher, Kelly, and Susan Calloway. “Addressing the Need for Mental Health Screening 
of Newly Resettled Refugees: A Pilot Project.” Journal of Primary Care & 
Community Health 7, no. 3 (July 1, 2016): 199–203. https://doi.org/10.1177/
2150131916636630. 
Population.us. “Utica, NY Population.” Accessed October 5, 2019. https://population.us/
ny/utica/. 
Rasmussen, Raea, and Jacob Poushter. “People around the World Express More Support 
for Taking in Refugees than Immigrants.” Pew Research Center, August 9, 2019. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/09/people-around-the-world-
express-more-support-for-taking-in-refugees-than-immigrants/. 
Refugee Council USA. “History, Legislative Authority, & Major Administrative 
Agencies.” Accessed July 12, 2019. http://www.rcusa.org/history. 
Refugees Deeply. “The Debate over Integration: An Explainer.” Accessed November 22, 
2019. https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2017/06/30/the-debate-over-
integration-an-explainer. 
Reuters. “Exclusive: Dozens of Refugee Resettlement Offices to Close as Trump 
Downsizes Program.” February 14, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
immigration-refugees-exclusive-idUSKCN1FY1EJ. 
Robinet, Fabrice. “Welcome, Refugees. Now Pay Back Your Travel Loans.” New York 
Times, March 15, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/nyregion/refugees-
travel-loans.html. 
Scott, Alissa. “‘Town That Loves Refugees’: Is it Perception or Reality in Utica?” 
Observer-Dispatch, February 27, 2017. https://www.uticaod.com/news/
20170227/town-that-loves-refugees-is-it-perception-or-reality-in-utica. 
Segal, Uma A., and Doreen Elliott. Refugees Worldwide. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO, 2012. 
Shaw, Stacey A., and Patrick Poulin. “Findings from an Extended Case Management 
U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program.” Journal of International Migration and 
Integration 16, no. 4 (November 2015): 1099–1120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s12134-014-0374-0. 
97 
Simich, Laura, Morton Beiser, and Farah N. Mawani. “Social Support and the 
Significance of Shared Experience in Refugee Migration and Resettlement.” 
Western Journal of Nursing Research 25, no. 7 (November 1, 2003): 872–91. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0193945903256705. 
Smith, R. Scott “The Case of a City Where 1 in 6 Residents Is a Refugee: Ecological 
Factors and Host Community Adaptation in Successful Resettlement.” American 
Journal of Community Psychology 42, no. 3–4 (December 2008): 328–42. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10464-008-9208-6. 
Sorensen, Martin Selsoe. “Denmark, with an Eye on Muslims, Requires New Citizens to 
Shake Hands.” New York Times, December 20, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/12/20/world/europe/denmark-muslims-handshake-law.html. 
Stein, Barry. “The Geneva Conferences and the Indochinese Refugee Crisis.” The 
International Migration Review 13, no. 4 (1979): 716–23. https://doi.org/10.2307/
2545184. 
Taft, Julia Vadala, David S. North, and David A. Ford. Refugee Resettlement in the U.S.: 
Time for a New Focus. Washington, DC: New TransCentury Foundation, 1979. 
Thomas, Cara. “Refugee Centers to Receive State Funding.” Spectrum News, April 12, 
2017. https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nys/central-ny/news/2017/04/12/refugee-
centers-to-receive-state-funding. 
Thomas More Law Center. “Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Is Petitioned to Rehear the 
Federal Refugee Resettlement Opinion ‘Painfully’ at Odds with Supreme Court 




Thomassen, Henrik. The Integration of Refugees in Denmark. Luxembourg: European 
Parliament Policy Department, August 2019). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/ 
etudes/STUD/2019/638397/IPOL_STU(2019)638397(ANN02)_EN.pdf. 
Tracey, Sara. “More Refugee-Owned Businesses Part of County’s Growth Strategy.” 
Observer-Dispatch, October 28, 2013. https://www.uticaod.com/article/
20131028/NEWS/310289850. 
Tyson, Catherine. “Towards a New Framework for Integration in the US.” Forced 
Migration Review, no. 54 (February 2017): 48–49. 
98 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “US Resettlement Partners.” Accessed 
March 8, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/us-resettlement-
partners.html?query=u.s.%20 
resettlement%20agencies. 
United States Conference on Catholic Bishops. “Refugee Travel Loans Collection.” 
Accessed July 22, 2019. http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-
dignity/migrants-refugees-and-travelers/refugee-travel-loans-collection/
index.cfm. 
United States History. “History of Utica, New York.” Accessed October 10, 2019. 
https://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h2474.html. 
University of Utah. “Fact Sheet: Refugees in Utah.” April 2017. https://gardner.utah.edu/
wp-content/uploads/Refugee-Fact-Sheet-Final.pdf. 
USAHello. “Utica New York Welcomes Refugees.” Accessed November 25, 2019. 
https://usahello.org/help-refugees/utica-new-york/. 
U.S. Census. “QuickFacts: Utica City, New York.” Accessed October 10, 2019. 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/uticacitynewyork/LND110210. 
U.S. Department of State. “The Reception and Placement Program.” Accessed April 2, 
2019, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm. 
U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs. “Report of the Visa Office 2018.” 
Accessed November 8, 2019. https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-
law0/visa-statistics/annual-reports/report-of-the-visa-office-2018.html. 
U.S. Population 2019. “Population Of Utah 2019.” Accessed November 24, 2019. 
https://uspopulation2019.com/population-of-utah-2019.html. 
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Abandoned on Arrival: Implications for 
Refugees and Local Communities Burdened by a U.S. Refugee System That Is Not 
Working. Washington, DC: U.S. Printing Office, 2010. 
Utah Refugee Connection. “Learn.” Accessed October 10, 2019. 
https://serverefugees.org/learn/. 
Utržan, Damir, Elizabeth Wieling, and Timothy Piehler. “A Needs and Readiness 
Assessment of the United States Refugee Resettlement Program: Focus on Syrian 
Asylum-Seekers and Refugees.” International Migration 57, no. 1 (2019): 127–
44. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12479. 
van Selm, Joanne. “Public-Private Partnerships in Refugee Resettlement: Europe and the 
US.” Journal of International Migration and Integration 4, no. 2 (December 
2003): 157–75. http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1007/s12134-003-1031-1. 
99 
Vliegenthart, Rens, and Conny Roggeband. “Framing Immigration and Integration: 
Relationships between Press and Parliament in the Netherlands.” The 
International Communication Gazette 69, no. 3 (2007): 295–319. 
Westcott, Lucy. “A Brief History of Refugees Paying Back the U.S. Government for 
Their Travel.” Newsweek, December 12, 2015. https://www.newsweek.com/brief-
history-refugees-paying-back-us-government-their-travel-403241. 
White House. “Executive Order on Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee 
Resettlement.” September 26, 2019. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/executive-order-enhancing-state-local-involvement-refugee-resettlement/. 
White House Task Force on New Americans. Strengthening Communities by Welcoming 
All Residents: A Federal Strategic Action Plan on Immigrant & Refugee 
Integration. Washington, DC: White House, 2015. 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=764654. 
Woods, Bob. “Despite Trump’s Draconian Policies, Refugees Continue Boosting New 
York’s Rust Belt Economy.” CNBC, July 10, 2018. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/
07/02/how-refugees-continue-boosting-new-yorks-rust-belt-economy.html. 
World Population Review. “Denmark Population 2019 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs).” 
Accessed November 26, 2019. http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/
denmark-population/. 
———. “Salt Lake City, Utah Population 2019 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs).” 
Accessed November 24, 2019. http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/salt-
lake-city-population/. 
———. “Utica, New York Population 2019.” July 6, 2019. 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/utica-ny-population/. 
Young, Yvette M. “Why Refugees Need More Than Just Immediate Employment.” 
Scholars Strategy Network, May 14, 2019. https://scholars.org/contribution/why-
refugees-need-more-just-immediate-employment. 
Zong, Jie, Michael Fix, and Kate Hooper. How Are Refugees Faring? Integration at U.S. 
and State Levels. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2017. 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/how-are-refugees-faring-integration-us-
and-state-levels. 
Zucker, Norman L. “Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Policy and Problems.” 
The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 467, no. 1 
(May 1, 1983): 172–86. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716283467001013. 
   
100 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
101 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
